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Abstract 
Background: Rumination and worry represent two forms of repetitive negative 
thinking (RNT) common in mood and anxiety disorders. While they have many 
similarities, it is unclear whether there are fundamental differences in content, 
mentation style and functions, or whether these are artefacts of different definitions 
and research focuses, such that both are fundamentally instances of the same process 
of RNT. This review aimed to determine whether direct comparisons of episodes of 
rumination and worry suggest fundamental similarities or differences between them. 
Methods: Studies were included if they were empirical studies comparing 
characteristics of episodes of rumination and worry, either in the context of 
depression and/or generalised anxiety, or in a non-clinical context. Only studies 
published in English in peer-reviewed journals were included. Key exclusion criteria 
included studies solely of trait rumination and worry as measured by standardised 
questionnaire. Searches were made of PsycINFO, Scopus, Web of Science and 
PubMed through to March 2017. Quality was assessed using a specifically developed 
tool. 
Results: 9 studies were included, covering both naturally occurring and induced 
rumination and worry in clinical and non-clinical populations, using experimental 
and observation methodology. The strongest evidence was for worry being more 
verbal than rumination, for rumination and worrying containing past-, present- and 
future-oriented thoughts, and for both leading to a worsening of mood. Rumination 
and worry are likely to be more abstract than neutral thinking, but the evidence is 
contradictory as to whether they differ from each other. Rumination emerged as 
more past-oriented, and worry more future-oriented, but this may be affected by the 
definitions used. Poorer quality evidence suggested that rumination may be more 
self-focused, and that there may be greater associations between rumination and 
sadness, and between worry with anxiety and arousal.  
Discussion: This review adds further evidence for a small number of similarities 
and differences between the rumination and worry that align with findings from 
separate studies of these forms of RNT, and suggests some difference between the 
two constructs as they are currently defined. Heterogeneous aims and methodology, 
contradictory findings and some methodological flaws limited the conclusions that 
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could be drawn. Definitions of rumination and worry given to participants may have 
contaminated findings, particularly in relation to temporal orientation. It is unclear 
whether all studies were examining the same constructs. Future research would 
benefit from greater clarity about aspects of RNT are being investigated.  
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1. Introduction 
Thinking repeatedly about negative topics is a common feature of many 
psychological difficulties, particularly (although by no means exclusively) mood and 
anxiety disorders. Repetitive negative thinking (RNT), defined as “repetitive thinking 
about one or more negative topics that is experienced as difficult to control” (Ehring 
& Watkins, 2008, p. 193), has thus been identified as a transdiagnostic process 
(Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2005). What is unclear, however, is the extent 
to which different forms of RNT represent closely related but fundamentally distinct 
processes (e.g., Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & 
Shortridge, 2003), or whether they are essentially broadly the same process examined 
in slightly different ways in different research contexts (e.g., Beckwé, Deroost, Koster, 
De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2014). 
Two of the most commonly studied forms of RNT are rumination and worry. 
Rumination has been conceptualised in a number of different ways, with some quite 
marked differences between them, making it difficult to offer a single accepted 
definition (Smith & Alloy, 2009). Probably the most frequently cited model is that of 
Nolen-Hoeksema (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008), whose response styles theory conceptualises rumination as 
“repetitive and passive thinking about one’s symptoms of depression and the possible 
causes and consequences of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003, p. 107) with 
consequent disruptive impacts on mood, problem-solving and instrumental 
behaviour. 
Worry has been defined as “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden 
and relatively uncontrollable … [that] represents an attempt to engage in mental 
problem-solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility 
of one or more negative outcomes” (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 
1983, p. 10). Although other conceptualisations of worry exist, they typically focus on 
these primary characteristics of uncertainty, possible negative outcomes and 
unpleasantness (Berenbaum, 2010). 
  11 
1.1. Associations with depression and anxiety 
Although rumination has typically been linked to depression, and worry to anxiety 
(indeed, it forms part of the diagnostic criteria for generalised anxiety disorder 
[GAD]; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), it is generally accepted that both 
forms of RNT are common in mood and anxiety disorders. What is less clear is 
whether there are indeed stronger associations between rumination and depression, 
and between worry and anxiety. Research examining trait rumination and worry as 
predictors of depression and anxiety have reached different conclusions, possibly 
resulting from differences in measures, populations, and approaches to modelling the 
relationship.  
Stronger relationships between trait rumination and depressive symptoms, and trait 
worry and anxiety symptoms, have been found in populations with current major 
depressive disorder (MDD) and GAD (Yang et al., 2014), and in non-clinical 
populations (Hughes, Alloy, & Cogswell, 2008). Meta-analyses have indicated that 
mood disorders are more strongly associated with rumination than are anxiety 
disorders (Olatunji, Naragon-Gainey, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2013), while severity and 
frequency of worry (though not its presence per se) distinguish anxiety disorders from 
other conditions (Olatunji, Wolitzky-Taylor, Sawchuk, & Ciesielski, 2010). 
A more mixed picture has been found in other studies, for example finding a link 
between worry and anxiety but not depression and rumination (Muris, Roelofs, 
Meesters, & Boomsma, 2004), or that worry is associated with both anxious and 
depressive symptoms, but rumination only with depressive symptoms (Hong, 2007). 
Other studies again have found no differences: either that rumination and worry are 
equally associated with depression and anxiety disorders (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, 
& Nathan, 2013), or that they are both associated with anxiety symptoms but not 
depressive symptoms (Calmes & Roberts, 2007). 
The extent to which measures of trait rumination and worry overlap may, of course, 
contribute to the mixed findings. One study found that 84% of the shared variance 
between rumination and worry overlapped with a separate measure of RNT; 
nevertheless the unique variance of rumination measures was associated with major 
depressive disorder (MDD) symptoms only, and the unique variance of worry 
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measures with GAD symptoms only (Spinhoven, Drost, van Hemert, & Penninx, 
2015). 
Overall, it appears that a propensity to ruminate tends to be more closely associated 
with depression, and a propensity to worry tends to be more closely associated with 
anxiety. However, these findings are not wholly consistent and may vary with 
populations studied. A more fundamental issue, though, is whether measures of trait 
rumination and worry are, in fact, genuinely measuring different constructs.  
1.2. Factor analyses 
Several studies have used factor analysis to examine this question of whether different 
constructs underlie the trait measures. Again, the studies have been carried out with 
different populations and, in some cases, different measures and analyses, but in this 
case have tended to reach broadly similar conclusions. 
Three analyses of the two most common measures, the Ruminative Response Scale 
(RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), have found they load onto four 
factors: two forms of rumination, worry and the absence of worry (Fresco, Frankel, 
Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Goring & Papageorgiou, 2008; Yang et al., 2014). 
Other studies, using different measures, find fewer factors, but still distinguish 
between rumination and worry (Carney, Harris, Moss, & Edinger, 2010; D’Hudson 
& Saling, 2010; Muris et al., 2004; Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, & Alloy, 2010). These 
studies would tend to suggest then, that rumination and worry can be distinguished 
from each other. 
There have been some conflicting findings, however, which have identified a more 
general RNT factor onto which rumination and worry items both load. One study 
identified a nested four factor model for the RRS and the PSWQ, with one worry 
and two rumination factors nested within an RNT factor (McEvoy & Brans, 2013), 
while another found them to be best modelled by a single RNT factor (Topper, 
Molenaar, Emmelkamp, & Ehring, 2014). 
More generally, the conclusion that rumination and worry are separate constructs on 
the basis of factor analysis can be challenged on the grounds that the wording of the 
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measures used maybe introducing additional variance (McEvoy et al., 2013). The 
RRS is completed with respect to a time “when you feel down, sad, or depressed” 
and includes items that refer to depression, while every item in the PSWQ makes 
reference to worry. There is evidence to suggest that this does indeed confound the 
findings: when items from each (combined with items from additional scales) were 
reworded to remove references to depression and worry, the resulting RNT 
questionnaire now loaded a single factor of RNT (McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 
2010). 
 
Although there is evidence to suggest that rumination and worry may be different, 
then, the studies considered thus far have all taken questionnaire-based measures of 
the tendency to ruminate and worry as the basis for comparison, and the findings 
may be affected by the nature and wording of the measures. It is therefore helpful to 
consider what can be learnt about the actual behaviours of ruminating and worrying 
through studies of episode of rumination and worry. 
1.3. Episodes of rumination and worry 
The separate literatures on rumination and worry are wide-ranging, and have 
encompassed, among other aspects: the content of ruminative and worrisome 
thinking; the mentation styles involved in each; perceptions of, and beliefs relating to, 
RNT held by people who ruminate and worry; short-term sequelae (as opposed to 
the longer-term outcomes of mood and anxiety disorders); and possible functions. 
1.3.1. Content 
1.3.1.1. Temporal orientation 
In the definitions given above, a past and present temporal orientation is implied in 
the definition of rumination, and a future orientation in the definition of worry, and a 
distinction is often made between the two in these terms (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Smith & Alloy, 2009). In practice, studies of 
temporal orientation suggest a less clear-cut distinction. 
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Studies have identified ruminative thought encompassing past, present and future. In 
one, rumination about the past was rated as more frequent than present and future, 
but all three were endorsed (Newby & Moulds, 2012). In another, participants listed 
rumination topics; of these, many do appear past- and present-oriented, but some are 
clearly future-oriented (e.g., ‘Thinking about the future’; Pearson, Brewin, Rhodes, & 
McCarron, 2008). For worry, ratings for the proportion or extent of future-focused 
thoughts may be as low as approximately a half (self-report of worry in general; 
Borkovec et al., 1983; self-report after induced worry; Frala, Mischel, Knapp, Autry, 
& Leen-Feldner, 2014) to under one third (experimenter-rated analysis of worry 
streams; Molina, Borkovec, Peasley, & Person, 1998). 
It has been suggested that, despite the apparent overlap, there is a difference in the 
overall temporal focus of rumination and worry even when they contain elements of 
past, present and future orientation. For example, a past focus on worry might be 
driven by concerns for future implications (Berenbaum, 2010). However, it is not 
clear how rooted in evidence this distinction is. 
1.3.1.2. Topics and themes 
Rumination is typically said to be focused primarily on the self, involving negative 
appraisals of one’s feelings and situation, and the meanings of these (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). In dysphoric people, thinking 
about the self tends to be negative and self-critical (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, 
& Berg, 1999), and people with MDD have endorsed a number of negative and self-
focused rumination themes (e.g. ‘About the kind of person I am’ Newby & Moulds, 
2012). Chronically depressed participants have reported rumination topics involving 
negative appraisals and attempts to find meaning, often self-focused, such as “Why 
did I do this and not something different?”, although also some broader topics (e.g., 
‘The suffering going on in the world’; Pearson et al., 2008). 
Although worry is not usually described as self-focused in the way that rumination is, 
many of the commonly identified worry topics have personal significance (e.g., family 
and personal relationships, health and injury; Holaway, Rodebaugh, & Heimberg, 
2006), and worrying may include a focus on thinking about the implications of events 
(Behar, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2005; Hoyer, Becker, & Roth, 2001). 
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However, even when the broad themes of rumination and worry appear similar, 
there may be differences in the way these topics are thoughts about. For example, 
repetitive thinking about problems may focus on self-blame for the problems in 
rumination (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), and on attempts to solve problems in worry 
(Szabó & Lovibond, 2006a). 
1.3.2. Mentation style 
1.3.2.1. Abstract vs concrete thought 
In general, repetitive thinking may be less constructive when it is not only negative 
but also more abstract and less concrete – that is, more focused on generalities and 
less focused on specific details (Watkins, 2008). There is evidence to suggest that both 
rumination (Cribb, Moulds, & Carter, 2006; Goldwin, Behar, & Sibrava, 2013; 
Watkins & Moulds, 2007) and worry (McGowan et al., 2017; Stöber, 1998) tend to 
be more abstract. Furthermore, worrying leads to less concrete problem descriptions 
(Stöber, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000), and people with GAD describe their problems 
in less concrete terms than non-anxious people, a difference that is no longer found 
following successful cognitive therapy (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002).  
Although there has been more research into the abstract nature of thinking in worry 
than in rumination, marked differences between the two have not been explicitly 
proposed. 
1.3.2.2. Verbal thoughts vs imagery 
It has been suggested that worry may be characterised by a greater degree of verbal 
thought than rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). There is certainly 
considerable evidence that verbal thought is more common than imagery in worry 
(Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Hirsch, Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & 
Borkovec, 2012; Hoyer et al., 2001; McGowan et al., 2017). 
However, the evidence for rumination is more mixed. One study with chronically 
depressed participants found that nearly all reported some verbal thought, just over a 
quarter reported verbal thought only, and the remainder a mixture of verbal thought 
and sensory imagery (Pearson et al., 2008). Another study with participants with 
MDD, in contrast, found only 5% reported verbal thoughts only, and and fewer than 
  16 
half reported some degree of verbal thinking (Newby & Moulds, 2012). Whether 
rumination and worry differ in this respect therefore remains unclear. 
1.3.3. Perceptions and beliefs 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) have proposed that ruminating is intended, from the 
person’s perspective, to help them to gain insight into the meaning of events and to 
solve problems, while worrying is intended to prepare for dealing with anticipated 
threat. 
There is indeed evidence to suggest that depressed people believe that rumination 
helps them understand what has gone wrong and how to make things better or 
prevent a recurrence (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a, 2001b; Watkins & Moulds, 
2005). Moreover, endorsement of such beliefs is predictive of a general tendency to 
ruminate (Weber & Exner, 2013) and of episodes of rumination in day to day life 
(Kubiak, Zahn, Siewert, Jonas, & Weber, 2014).  
There is also evidence from research (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995) and from clinical 
practice (Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens, & Diaz, 1999; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 
2004) to suggest that people with GAD do indeed hold beliefs about worry relevant 
to threat: that it will help them to avoid bad outcomes or, failing that, to prepare for 
the worst. However, as with rumination, people may believe that worry helps with 
solving problems (Borkovec et al., 1999; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Dugas et al., 
2004; Szabó & Lovibond, 2006b), so the distinction may not be quite as clear cut as 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) propose. 
In addition to these positive beliefs, people who ruminate or worry, particularly to 
excess, often hold a number of negative beliefs about the effects of doing so. Both 
rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a) and worry (Hirsch, Mathews, Lequertier, 
Perman, & Hayes, 2013; Hoyer et al., 2001; Penney, Mazmanian, & Rudanycz, 
2013; Wells, 2006) may be perceived as uncontrollable, damaging, excessive, and 
likely to interfere with the ability to take action. Rumination may also be perceived as 
leading to a risk of rejection (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a), although this may reflect 
a more general negative thinking style in depression. 
Overall, it appears that there are a number of similarities in the beliefs that people 
hold about rumination and worry, including about their potential value in helping to 
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solve problems, and their deleterious effects. There may be differences within this, for 
example in the extent to which rumination is believed to help gain insight into 
problems and prevent recurrence, and worry to ward off future threat and problems. 
1.3.4. Affective sequelae 
Rumination can result in an immediate increase in depressed mood (Ciesla & 
Roberts, 2007; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2004), and can prolong existing 
depressed mood (Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009). It appears rumination leads to 
worsening of mood in people who are already dysphoric or depressed (Donaldson & 
Lam, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993), although this findings was not replicated in a study with adolescents (Park et 
al., 2004). 
Worry can result in an increase in negative affect (Llera & Newman, 2010), including 
greater anxiety, distress and depressed mood (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Ruscio & 
Borkovec, 2004), and a range of physiological indictors of a sustained negative 
emotional state (Newman, Llera, Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguay, 2013). In a 
parallel with the effects of rumination on people with pre-existing low mood, it is 
possible that worry may have a more negative impact on people with GAD (Ruscio 
& Borkovec, 2004), although this apparent affect may represent higher baseline levels 
of negative affect (Llera & Newman, 2010) 
Rumination and worry thus both have immediate negative effects on mood, and this 
impact may be greater in clinical populations. There is evidence for worry 
influencing both depressive and anxious moods, while the effect of rumination on 
anxious mood does not appear to have attracted research attention, so it is unclear 
whether they differ in this regard 
1.3.5. Functions 
Borkovec and colleagues (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998; Sibrava & 
Borkovec, 2006) have proposed a cognitive avoidance model of worry, in which 
worry is understood as an attempt to avoid threat. In particular, it is suggested, the 
less concrete and more verbal natures of worry may interact to facilitate this, with 
more abstract thinking supporting the avoidance of threatening images. However, 
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evidence to support the role of verbal worry in reducing negative emotions has not 
been forthcoming (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). An alternative contrast avoidance 
model proposes that worry enables avoidance of emotional contrast for people with 
GAD – that is, it enables them to stay in a more consistently negative affective state 
rather than experiencing more variable affect – which could help to explain why 
people report finding worrying both unpleasant and helpful (Newman & Llera, 
2011). 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) have argued that rumination enables a rather different 
form of avoidance: a behavioural avoidance of aversive situations and the need to 
take responsibility for actions. Rumination, they suggest, leads to poorer engagement 
in problem solving (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) and a 
reduced willingness to take part in positive activities (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993). Moulds et al. (2007), on the other hand, suggest that rumination 
may also serve a function of cognitive avoidance similar to that proposed for worry; 
less experimental evidence exists to support this, but associations have been found 
between trait measures of rumination and cognitive avoidance (Cribb et al., 2006; 
Moulds et al., 2007). 
1.4. Current review 
It is clear from the literatures on rumination and worry that these two forms of RNT, 
both associated with mood and anxiety disorders, are at least very closely related 
processes. They are both characterised by relatively abstract thinking about 
problems, typically although not wholly focused on the self. They are experienced as 
negative and sometimes uncontrollable, and have negative outcomes, and yet are 
often regarded by those who engage in them frequently as at least somewhat 
beneficial, particularly in relation to problem-solving. They are both hypothesised to 
serve a function of avoidance. 
There is also evidence to suggest some differences between them. Although both can 
be focussed on past, present and future concerns, rumination is reported to be more 
past- and present-oriented overall, and worry more future-oriented. Worry may be 
characterised by more verbal thinking. Rumination may be perceived more as a tool 
for understanding problems to prevent recurrence, and worry as a tool for predicting 
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threat to prevent and mitigate against its occurrence. Rumination may serve to 
enable more behavioural avoidance, and worry more cognitive avoidance. 
What is less clear, though, is how reliable these findings of similarities and differences 
are. The literature examining rumination and worry separately in some of these areas 
is sparse, and the findings related to each construct are not wholly consistent, 
suggesting that differences in population, definitions, study questions and 
methodology may influence the outcomes. Separate approaches to examining 
rumination and worry could conceivably contribute to a greater appearance of 
difference than is truly warranted, and findings could reflect differences in definitions, 
measures and research focus rather than fundamental underlying differences in 
process. This is of potential clinical significance: if rumination and worry are 
fundamentally the same processes, then interventions to target one are likely to be of 
value in the other, whereas meaningful differences between them may require 
different approaches to intervention. 
This leaves open the question, then, of what direct comparisons between rumination 
and worry would show in regard to similarities and differences. This is the key 
question that this review attempts to answer. 
1.4.1. Aims 
This review aims to answer the question:  
• To what extent do direct comparisons of episodes of rumination and worry 
suggest fundamental similarities or differences between them? 
In particular, it seeks to determine whether such comparisons provide insights into 
similarities or differences relating to: 
• The content of thoughts (including but not limited to temporal orientation) 
• Mentation styles (including but not limited to abstract or concrete nature, and 
verbal- or imagery-based nature) 
• Perceptions of, and beliefs relating to, rumination and worry 
• Short-term sequelae 
• Functions 
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Additionally, it will consider: 
• Whether the findings differ for clinical and non-clinical populations 
In doing so, the focus will be on rumination and worry in the general population, and 
in people with depression or GAD, as these are the clinical disorders most closely 
associated with these forms of RNT. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Search strategy 
Searches were completed in PsycINFO, Scopus, Web of Science and PubMed, using 
the following search terms in titles, abstracts and keywords: 
(ruminat* OR brooding OR “depressive thinking” OR “depressive thought*”)  
AND (worr* OR “anxious thinking” OR “anxious thought*” ) 
Searches were run in the week beginning 26 December 2016. They were re-run on 4 
March 2017, limited to results from 2016-17. Limits were set on the searches as 
follows: Peer reviewed journal; English language (PsycINFO); Article or Review; 
Psychology or Social Science; English; Journal (Scopus); Categories - Psychology 
Clinical, Psychology Multidisciplinary, Psychology, Psychology Experimental, 
Psychology Biological, Psychology Applied; Document types - Article or Review; 
Language - English (Web of Science); English, Journal Article (PubMed). A search 
was made for Medical Subject Headings (MESH) descriptors on PubMed for 
“worry” and “rumination”, but none were found. 
Manual searching for additional records was carried out by reviewing the reference 
sections of all included articles, and by performing Google Scholar citations searches 
for the included articles. 
All article titles were screened, and articles which clearly did not meet the inclusion 
criteria were screened out. Abstracts of the remaining articles were screened, and 
those which did not meet the inclusion criteria or clearly met one for more of the 
exclusion criteria were screened out. The full texts of the remaining articles were 
retrieved, and each article reviewed again the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
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2.2. Inclusion criteria 
Articles were included if they met the following criteria, and did not meet the 
exclusion criteria: 
• Empirical studies comparing characteristics of episodes of rumination and worry, 
either in the context of depression and/or generalised anxiety disorder, or in a 
non-clinical context 
• Studies published in English in a peer-reviewed journal 
2.3. Exclusion criteria 
Articles were excluded were if they met any of the following criteria: 
• Studies solely examining trait rumination and worry as measured by standardised 
questionnaire 
• Studies of depressive or anxious thinking that do not include repetitive negative 
thought (e.g., single negative automatic thoughts; intrusions) 
• Studies of other specific forms of repetitive negative thinking (e.g., angry 
rumination, anticipatory social anxiety and post-event processing in social 
anxiety, obsessional thoughts), unless rumination and worry are also included 
• Studies of rumination or worry solely in the context of clinical disorders other 
than depressive disorder or generalised anxiety disorder (e.g., eating disorders, 
health anxiety, panic disorders, OCD, social phobia, psychosis) 
• Clinical studies, case series and case reports of therapies and interventions for 
rumination and worry, or in which rumination and worry are outcomes measures 
for the treatment 
2.4. Quality assessment 
As the studies were highly heterogeneous, no suitable existing quality assessment 
measure could be found. An assessment tool was therefore developed specially for the 
review, drawing on a range of existing tools and guidelines (Effective Public Health 
Practice Project, 1998; i-HOP, 2015; Public Health Wales Observatory, 2014; 
Rosella et al., 2016; Specialist Unit for Review Evidence (SURE), 2013). Additional 
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guidance for rating an fMRI study was taken from a set of reporting guidelines 
widely used for this purpose (Poldrack et al., 2008). Studies were rated on 10 aspects 
of quality, covering: aims; definitions and operationalising of key concepts; selection, 
description and grouping of participants; methodology and measurements; data 
analysis and reporting; and conclusions. Each item was scored on a 3 point scale (0-
2), giving a maxim score of 20. The tool is included in the Appendix. As a reliability 
check, 20% of articles were scored by a second assessor, blind to the first assessor’s 
ratings. 
3. Results 
3.1. Search results 
See Figure 1 for a summary of the search process. The initial search produced 655 
results after duplicates were removed. Manual searching of citations yielded one 
additional study for consideration. After exclusions, 9 papers were included in the 
final review. Of these, two papers each included two studies (McLaughlin, Borkovec, 
& Sibrava, 2007; Steinfurth, Alius, Wendt, & Hamm, 2016), and one (Kircanski, 
Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 2017) was an analysis of further aspects of 
the data collected in a another study (Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & 
Gotlib, 2015). Two studies had primary aims of testing hypotheses relating to 
rumination (Dickson, Ciesla, & Reilly, 2012) or worry (Steinfurth et al., 2016), but in 
each case both rumination and worry were included, and comparisons reported, 
enabling their inclusion in this review.  
Four of the included studies required careful consideration to determine whether 
they fit the inclusion criterion of “comparing characteristics of episodes of rumination 
and worry”. Two studies sampled participants’ thoughts at moments throughout the 
day, taking ratings of the extent to which they were ruminating and worrying at that 
moment (Kircanski et al., 2015, 2017). They may therefore have captured brief 
automatic thoughts and intrusions at these times. However, longer episodes of 
repetitive thinking have a greater chance of being sampled, and it was assumed that 
sufficient repetitive thinking would be included to justify their inclusion. 
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One study asked participants to rate aspects of instances of “depressive thoughts” and 
“anxious thoughts” (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999), which again could include brief 
automatic thoughts. However, the study reported an average duration of 17 minutes 
for depressive thoughts, and 15 minutes for anxious thoughts, suggesting that 
episodes of repetitive thinking were being captured. Similarly, another study 
examined instances of “thoughts and images” that may not have included repetitive 
thinking, but reported average durations of 26 minutes for rumination and 11 
minutes for worry (Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). 
Additionally, two studies were rejected for not meeting this criterion after particularly 
detailed consideration. One study used similar methodology to Watkins et al.’s study 
to identify thoughts; participants then rated the extent to which they used strategies 
to deal with them. However, in this case the thoughts are described as “intrusions” 
and no evidence is presented to indicate that they represent longer episodes of 
relative thinking. Furthermore, the primary data analytic approach is a factor 
analysis of strategies related to tendencies to ruminate and worry. It was therefore 
decided that this did not give reliable information on characteristics of episodes of 
rumination and worry. 
The other study asked participants to rate rumination and worry against a number of 
criteria; no definitions were given of the terms, and there was no requirement to link 
answers to specific instances of rumination or worry (Hoyer, Gloster, & Herzberg, 
2009). Although a number of the criteria were of interest for the review (e.g., 
temporal orientation), it was decided that the study was examining general 
understandings of the concepts rather than features of specific episodes of rumination 
and worry. 
Three further studies were excluded because although they collected data on 
episodes of worry and rumination, these were collapsed into a single category of 
“perseverative cognition” for analysis, so no comparisons could be made (C. 
Ottaviani, Medea, Lonigro, Tarvainen, & Couyoumdjian, 2015; Cristina Ottaviani, 
Shapiro, & Couyoumdjian, 2013; Zoccola, Dickerson, & Yim, 2011). 
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Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram of search results 
Full-text articles 
assessed for eligibility
(n =  69)
Studies included in 
qualitative synthesis
(n =  9)
Records reviewed by 
abstract
(n = 273)









(n =  60)




(n =  1)
Records identified through 
database searching
(n = 655)
(Psycinfo n = 369; Scopus n = 259; 
























Adapted from: Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG, The PRISMA Group (2009). 
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA 
Statement. PLoS Med 6(7): e1000097. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed1000097
PRISMA 2009 Flow Diagram
¹Reasons for exclusions:
Not an empirical study comparing characteristics of episodes of rumination and 
worry (n =  27)
Studies solely examining trait rumination and worry as measured by standardised 
questionnaire (n = 21)
Studies of depressive or anxious thinking that do not include repetitive negative 
thought (n = 10)
Studies of other specific forms of repetitive negative thinking (n = 1)
Studies of rumination or worry solely in the context of clinical disorders other 
than depressive disorder or generalised anxiety disorder (n = 1)
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Table 1 
Details of included studies 
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Table 2 
Details of participants in included studies 
Authors, year Sample N Mean age (years) Female Subgroups 
Aldao et al. (2013) Community – clinical 
& non-clinical 
68 30.5 (Not reported) GAD N = 38 
Major depression N = 13 
Dickson et al. (2012) Adolescent, community 101 (78 in final 
analysis) 
16.7 60.7% (None) 
Goldwin & Behar 
(2012) 
Student 117 (Not reported) 56.4% (None) 
Kircanski et al. (2015) 
Kircanski et al. (2017) 
Community & clinical 70 32.9 (clinical); 
34.7 (non-clinical) 
100% GAD N = 15 
MDD N = 16 
MDD+GAD N = 20 
No disorder N = 19 
McLaughlin et al. 
(2007): Study 1 
Student  60  73.3% (None) 
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Authors, year Sample N Mean age (years) Female Subgroups 
McLaughlin et al. 
(2007): Study 2 
Student  109 18.6 75.2% HW & HR: N = 34 
HR: N = 40 
Control  N = 35 
Papageorgiou & 
Wells (1999) 
Student 54 20.7 64.8% (None) 
Steinfurth et al. 
(2016): Study 1 
Student 24 (23 in final 
analysis)  
23.3 50% (None) 
Steinfurth et al. 
(2016): Study 2 
Student 29 29 56.2% (None) 
Watkins et al. (2005) Mature student 175 (149 in final 
analysis)  
34.9 100% (None) 
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3.2. Overview of studies 
The studies are extremely heterogeneous in their approaches to comparing 
rumination and worry, both in terms of the ways in which they accessed information 
about participants’ rumination and worry, and in terms of the focus of the 
comparisons. A summary of the objectives, design, definitions of rumination and 
worry, key manipulations and measures used, and key findings of each study is given 
in Table 1. Participant details are given in Table 2. 
3.2.1. Basis for comparisons of rumination and worry 
All studies examined differences between rumination and worry within participants. 
Additionally, four studies made comparisons between subgroups defined by clinical 
status (Aldao, Mennin, & McLaughlin, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2015, 2017) or trait 
rumination and worry status (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Study 2) – see Table 1 for 
details. 
3.2.2. Definitions of rumination and worry 
The definitions of rumination and worry used in each study are included in Table 1. 
Studies in seven papers explicitly defined rumination and worry for participants. In 
doing so, all but one made reference one or more characteristics of rumination and 
worry: temporal orientation (Aldao et al., 2013; Goldwin & Behar, 2012; Kircanski et 
al., 2015, 2017; McLaughlin et al., 2007; Steinfurth et al., 2016), valence of thoughts 
(Aldao et al., 2013; Goldwin & Behar, 2012; Kircanski et al., 2015, 2017; 
McLaughlin et al., 2007), and verbal–imagery mentation styles (Goldwin & Behar, 
2012; McLaughlin et al., 2007). 
In two studies, no explicit definitions were given to participants, and rumination and 
worry were effectively defined by the use of questionnaires to which participants 
responded. One used forms of the RRS and the PSWQ adapted for daily use 
(Dickson et al., 2012). The other (Watkins et al., 2005) used forms of the RRS (with 
items not relating to intrusive thoughts removed, and supplemented by items drawing 
on previous research into rumination; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001) and the Worry 
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Domains Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992). These 
definitions include some implication of different temporal orientations (a small 
number of items in the RRS make reference to the past, and some WDQ items make 
reference to the future). Additionally, all items in Watkins et al.’s study were modified 
to begin with the words ‘‘Thought or images’’. 
3.2.3. Approaches to investigating rumination and worry 
3.2.3.1. Naturally occurring rumination and worry 
Four studies examined naturally occurring rumination and worry in day to day life, 
and one examined rumination and worry as it arose in the laboratory. 
Adolescent participants in Dickson et al.’s (2012) study completed records 
summarising their daily rumination and worry, along with measures of behavioural 
avoidance, cognitive avoidance and affect, for 7 days. The primary aim was to 
determine the temporal relationships between avoidance, rumination and affect as a 
test of an avoidance model of rumination, with worry included to place the findings 
in a broader context. 
Two studies analysed different aspects of the same dataset (Kircanski et al., 2015, 
2017). Clinical and non-clinical participants completed visual analogue scales of 
momentary rumination and worry eight times a day for 7 or 8 days. In the first study 
(Kircanski et al., 2015), additional measures were taken of various features of 
ruminative and worrisome thinking hypothesised to be similar or different between 
the two (e.g., temporal orientation, verbal-linguistic focus). In the second study, at 
each sampling point participants reported whether any significant events had taken 
place since the last sampling point, and also reported on current affect, enabling an 
examination of the temporal relationships between events, rumination and worry, 
and affect (Kircanski et al., 2017). 
In Papageorgiou and Wells’ (1999) study, student participants recorded their first two 
depressed thoughts and first two anxious thoughts in a two week period, to note their 
content and duration, and rated them on metacognitive beliefs, other features (e.g., 
temporal orientation, triggers) and related affect. 
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The laboratory-based study (Aldao et al., 2013) aimed to examine whether 
rumination and worry vary across emotional contexts, and to evaluate the 
relationship between rumination and worry and a physiological measure of 
emotional regulation, heart rate variability (HRV). Clinical and non-clinical 
participants observed emotional film clips intended to induce happy, sad and fearful 
moods while having HRV measured. They subsequently reported on the extent to 
which they had ruminated and worried during the films. 
3.2.3.2. Induced rumination and worry 
Three papers included studies in which participants were directly instructed to 
ruminate and worry in the laboratory. 
Two studies, which aimed to examine imagery, verbal thought and temporal 
orientation in rumination and worry, and their influence on affect, are reported by 
McLaughlin et al. (2007). Student participants completed a baseline period of 
uninstructed thinking, followed by periods of ruminating and of worrying, and 
reported intermittently on the content, temporal orientation and verbal/imagery 
nature of thoughts, along with affect and mood. The second study aimed to replicate 
the first, and compare findings across groups with differing levels of trait rumination 
and worry. 
Goldwin and Behar’s (Goldwin & Behar, 2012) study also used student participants 
and was closely modelled on McLaughlin et al.’s, taking similar measures. However, 
the aims were to determine the extent to which rumination and worry are 
characterised by more abstract thinking, and to test whether reduced concreteness 
contributes to reduced imagery; experimenters therefore rated the abstractness of 
reported thought content. 
The final paper consisted of two studies aimed to test evidence for the cognitive 
avoidance (Borkovec, 1994) and contrast avoidance (Llera & Newman, 2010) models 
of worry by examining neural and physiological correlates of worry (Steinfurth et al., 
2016). Rumination was included to provide a basis for comparison with another form 
of negative thinking. Student participants spent periods of time ruminating, worrying 
and relaxing. In Study 1, fMRI scans were competed during the different thought 
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periods, and in Study 2, measures were taken of skin conductance, heart rate, and 
eyblink responses to acoustic startle probes. 
3.2.3.3. Survey 
The remaining study did not assess rumination and worry at or soon after the time 
they occurred (2005). Instead, it used survey methodology to investigate experiences 
of ruminating and worrying. Mature student participants were given lists of 
ruminative and worrisome thoughts, and picked a single item from each that best 
represented their experience or that they thought most about. They completed a 
questionnaire for each, based on the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (Freeston, 
Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1992), covering appraisals, associated feelings, 
and strategies for dealing with the thoughts. 
3.3. Quality of included studies 
Each study was assigned a quality score using the Quality Assessment Tool; these are 
included in Table 1. Two papers (22% of the total) were rated by a second rater. The 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) measure of agreement was .44, which is 
considered “fair” (Cicchetti, 1994). 
The validity and reliability of approaches to measurement was an area of relative 
weakness in most studies. This reflects the lack of standardised tools for measuring 
episodes of rumination and worry (as opposed to trait rumination and worry). Most 
studies therefore used specially-developed measures, including visual analogue scales 
and Likert scales. Inevitably, the reliability and validity of these idiosyncratic 
measures is not well established, and this was an acknowledged limitation of most 
studies. Some studies made clear attempts to mitigate this with internal reliability 
checks, validation against other measures, and similar approaches (Dickson et al., 
2012; Kircanski et al., 2015, 2017), whereas others reported few such attempts 
(Goldwin & Behar, 2012; McLaughlin et al., 2007; Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999; 
Watkins et al., 2005). 
Checks for whether rumination and worry were reliably induced was another relative 
weakness. One used mood ratings as a manipulation check (Steinfurth et al., 2016), 
but as rumination and worry are both associated with a range of negative affect, this 
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may not be reliable measure. One used the reported percentage of past-oriented 
thought as a manipulation check for rumination, and of future-oriented thought for 
worry; in both cases this was less than 60%, with no discussion of whether this reflects 
successful manipulation (Goldwin & Behar, 2012). The final study reported an initial 
intent to use temporal orientation as the manipulation check, but found an 
unexpected pattern in which orientation checked during rumination; this was 
acknowledged as a limitation (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Steinfurth et al., 2016) 
One study made multiple comparisons between rumination and worry without 
correcting statistically for this (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999). This was reported as a 
deliberate decision, as such corrections increase the risk of Type II errors, which was 
felt to be less desirable in an exploratory study. However, this limitation is not 
acknowledged in the discussion of implications of the results. Findings of significant 
differences from this study may be less reliable. 
In the laboratory study of naturally occurring rumination and worry (Aldao et al., 
2013), there were some unexpected findings: levels of rumination and worry during 
different emotional conditions did not match what might be expected (e.g., worry 
was not greater during fear induction), and levels overall did not vary between 
clinical and non-clinical groups. This may suggest that levels of rumination and 
worry were not being accurately reported, and the findings of this study should be 
treated with some caution. 
None of the studies gave a clear justification for the sample size. The second paper by 
Kirkanski et al. (2017) referred to a power calculation having been completed to 
determine the sample size for both studies, but no details are given. It is therefore 
unclear what effect sizes any of the studies might have been expected to detect. In 
some cases, the sample sizes appear fairly small, which may have limited their ability 
to detect small to medium sized effects. 
3.4. Synthesis of findings 
All studies reported both similarities and differences between rumination and worry.  
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3.4.1. Content 
3.4.1.1. Temporal orientation 
Five studies within four papers explicitly investigated differences in temporal 
orientation. Of these, one study (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999) made no reference to 
temporal orientation in the definitions of rumination and worry given to participants; 
this increases the reliability of these findings, as reporting will not have been 
influenced by the wording of the definitions. Participants in this study gave ratings for 
the extent to which their thoughts were past-, present- and future-oriented (i.e., three 
separate ratings for each thought). Rumination was significantly more past-oriented 
than worry, but rumination and worry did not differ on the extent to which they 
were present- or future-oriented. Within each type of RNT, however, the the data 
shows an unexpected pattern, with rumination appearing being more present- and 
future-oriented than past, and worry being more present-oriented than future 
(although no significance tests are reported to confirm this). 
In Watkins et al.’s (2005) study, rumination and worry were defined by lists of 
ruminative and worrisome thought items, some of which implied a temporal 
orientation. As with the study above, separate ratings were given for the extent to 
which content was about the past, present and future. Rumination had more past 
content than worry; worry had more future content. They did not differ on present 
content. Again, ratings within each type of thought show an unexpected pattern, with 
both rumination and worry scoring highest for content about the present. 
Three studies provided participants with definitions of rumination and worry that 
included one or more explicit references to temporal orientation. In Kircanski et al.’s 
(2015) study of naturally occurring rumination and worry, past orientation was a 
significant predictor of rumination, and future orientation of worry. In both 
McLaughlin et al.’s (2007) studies, temporal orientation (fixed choice of past, present 
and future) was reported at each momentary sampling period during induced 
rumination and worry. Approximately three quarters of thoughts were past-oriented 
during rumination overall, and future-oriented during worry, although no 
significance tests are reported. Over all time sampling periods, rumination became 
significantly more present- and then future-oriented, while no change over time was 
found for worry. 
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Additionally, Goldwin and Behar (Goldwin & Behar, 2012) reported on temporal 
orientation as rated during induced rumination and worry (as a manipulation check, 
hence no significance tests are reported). 57.5% of worry ratings were future-
oriented, and 55.5% of rumination ratings were past-oriented. Their definitions also 
included reference to temporal orientation. 
Overall, these findings give some support to the idea that rumination is more past-
oriented, and worry more future-oriented. Temporal orientation may be more 
subject to change over time within episodes of rumination than within episodes of 
worry. However, more detailed examination of the data suggests considerable 
variation of temporal orientation within each construct. Furthermore, the findings 
must be treated with caution, as they may have been contaminated by the fact that 
participants in all but one study were given definitions indicative of a temporal 
orientation. 
3.4.1.2. Self-focus 
One study directly examined the question of whether rumination is more focused on 
the self than worry (Kircanski et al., 2015). At each momentary sampling point 
during this study of naturally occurring rumination and worry, participants rated 
their thoughts with a forced-choice rating of thoughts being mostly about “myself” or 
“not myself”. More self-focused content was a significant predictor of rumination but 
not of worry. However, there is a risk that this was contaminated by their definitions, 
as the definition for rumination was more suggestive of a self focus (“…my feelings 
and problems”) than that for worry (“…things that could happen”).  
Two other studies report potentially relevant findings. Steinfurth et al. (2016), using 
fMRI scanning, found that induced rumination, as contrasted with worry, was 
associated with increased activity in brain regions reported to be involved in self-
referential thinking, recall of emotional memory, and context-dependent episodic or 
autobiographic memory1. Watkins et al. (2005) asked participants to rate ruminative 
and worry topics on the extent to which the content was “personally important”, and 
                                                
1  The anterior cingulate gyrus, the left amygdala, the DMPFC (medial superior frontal 
gyrus), the bilateral DLPFC (inferior triangular and opercular frontal gyrus, middle and 
superior frontal gyrus), and the left hippocampus 
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found no difference in ratings, but this concept may only only be somewhat 
tangentially related to self-focus. 
Overall, these findings offer preliminary support for a greater self-focus in ruminative 
thinking, with the possibility that one key result was affected by definitions given to 
participants. 
3.4.2. Mentation style 
3.4.2.1. Abstract vs concrete thinking 
Two studies reported on the extent to which rumination and worry were 
characterised by abstract or concrete thinking. In Kircanski et al.’s (Kircanski et al., 
2015) study, level of abstractness was not a significant predictor of rumination. 
Unexpectedly, worry was associated with greater levels of concreteness (in the clinical 
group only). In contrast, Golden and Behar (2012), who rated samples of thoughts 
reported during induced rumination and worry, found no significant difference 
between them for degree of abstractness. They did find both rumination and worry 
to be more abstract than neutral thought. 
As Golden and Behar’s study involved more objective ratings of the level of 
abstraction, overall the findings offer some further support for rumination and worry 
being more abstract than other forms of thinking. No clear conclusions can be drawn 
concerning differences between rumination and worry, as the findings are 
contradictory. 
3.4.2.2. Verbal thought vs imagery 
Six studies in five papers investigated the extent to which rumination and worry are 
characterised by primarily verbal thought or by imagery. Of these, three report clear 
findings for worry being more verbal than rumination. One found that, on a scale of 
“all images” to “all verbal”, naturally occurring worry was rated as further towards 
the verbal end of the scale than rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999). In 
another, a verbal-linguistic focus was a predictor of naturally occurring worry but not 
rumination (based on a simple forced choice between whether their minds contained 
primarily ‘words’ or ‘images’ at each sampling point; Kircanski et al., 2015). At each 
sampling point during induced rumination and worry, Goldwin and Behar’s (2012) 
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participants rated the percentage of thoughts and imagery in the preceding period; 
worry was characterised by less imagery than rumination. 
One study found no difference in the ratings given to “percentage of verbal/visual” 
for rumination and worry (Watkins et al., 2005). As this study did not take ratings at 
the time of rumination and worry, or soon after, the percentage ratings may have 
been less accurate in this study. 
With regard to whether rumination and worry are both more verbal than other 
forms of thought, one study reported both to be more verbal than a neutral thinking 
period (Goldwin & Behar, 2012). Two further studies purport to find that worry 
involved more verbal-linguistic thought than neutral thinking, while rumination 
involved more imagery (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Studies 1 & 2); however, the 
statistical analyses are unclear: very few significance tests are reported, and in Study 
1, the difference between rumination and neutral thinking appears very small. 
Furthermore, although they report in the text that rumination is more visual than 
neutral thinking in Study 2, the figures they provide suggest the opposite. Their 
evidence should therefore be considered less than wholly reliable. 
Overall, these results offer support for worry being more verbal than rumination. 
There is also some further evidence for rumination and worry both being more 
verbal than other types of thought. These findings are unlikely to have been affected 
by definitions given to participants: studies generally either made no references to 
thoughts and images (Kircanski et al., 2015; Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999), or 
referred to them in both definitions (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Watkins et al., 2005). 
One, in error, referred “thoughts” in the definition of rumination and “thoughts and 
images” in the definition of worry, but nevertheless reported a greater association 
between imagery and rumination (Goldwin & Behar, 2012). 
3.4.3. Perceptions and beliefs 
3.4.3.1. Controllability 
Three studies examined participant’s perceptions of the controllability of their 
rumination and worry, with contradictory results that do not enable conclusions to be 
drawn. One found a difference, with rumination but not worry being predicted by 
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higher levels of uncontrollability (Kircanski et al., 2015). Two found no differences in 
ratings of controllability (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999; Watkins et al., 2005). The 
latter two studies also found no differences for the possibly related perceptions of 
rumination and worry as intrusive, voluntary or dismissible (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
1999; Watkins et al., 2005), or for the effort or difficulty associated with dismissing 
the thought (Watkins et al., 2005). 
3.4.3.2. Problem-solving 
Two studies investigated beliefs about problem-solving in relation to rumination and 
worry, again with contradictory findings. In one, worry was rated as requiring a 
greater effort to solve problems but also as associated with greater confidence in 
problem-solving abilities (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999). In the other, no differences 
were found for either of these variables, nor for belief that the problem can be solved 
(Watkins et al., 2005). It is worth noting that both of these studies investigated a 
range of perceptions and beliefs about rumination and worry, with many 
contradictory findings, and no discernible patterns in where they agreed and 
disagreed. This suggests that methodological differences are likely to have had a 
significant impact on findings in this area. 
3.4.4. Precursors and contexts 
Five studies examined one or more aspects of the contexts in which rumination and 
worry spontaneously occurred and/or their antecedents. One of these (an 
examination of avoidance as a precursor) is discussed in section 3.4.6 Functions below, 
as its primary aim was to test a theory of the function of rumination (Dickson et al., 
2012).  
Kircanksi et al. (2015) took ratings of two aspects of the context in which rumination 
and worry occurred: the extent to which participants “felt a sense of control over 
situations” and the extent to which they felt “a sense of certainty about situations”. 
As the ratings were made at the same time as the ratings for momentary rumination 
and worry, it is not possible to clear about whether these feelings preceded or 
followed the onset of rumination and worry. Their other paper from the same dataset 
(Kircanski et al., 2017), on the other hand, does enable an examination of the role of 
preceding events: in addition to reporting on momentary rumination and worry at 
  45 
eight points during the day, participants also reported on any “significant events” 
that had occurred since the previous sampling point.  
Taken together, their studies show the following patterns for clinical participants. 
Rumination was preceded by significant events that were rated as stressful but less 
important, and was associated in the moment with a sense of lack of control over 
situations. Worry was not preceded by significant events, and was associated with 
both a sense of lack of control and a sense of uncertainty. For non-clinical 
participants, the pattern of significant preceding events was reversed, with significant 
events only predicting worry. While these findings do show both similarities and 
differences between rumination and worry, an overall coherent pattern does not 
emerge. 
One study examined a single aspect of preceding events: a rating of the extent to 
which triggers were internal or external (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999). No difference 
between rumination and worry was found. 
One study enabled a comparison of the effects of induced moods on rumination and 
worry (Aldao et al., 2013). Participants watched emotional film clips to induce happy, 
sad and fearful moods, and reported on the extent to which they had ruminated and 
worried during the films. The only significant findings were that rumination was 
lower in the fear clip than the sad clip, and worry was lower in the neutral clip than 
the sad clip. As these results show a somewhat unexpected relationship between 
mood and thinking, they cast some doubt on the extent to which rumination and 
worry were occurring during the clips. 
Overall, these studies do not suggest any clear patterns of similarities or differences in 
relation to the contexts in which rumination and worry occur (although also see 
section 3.4.6 Functions below). 
3.4.5. Affective sequelae and physiological correlates 
Four studies in two papers report on the effects of induced rumination and worry on 
concurrent mood. All found negative effects of rumination and worry on mood in 
comparison to neutral control conditions: greater anxiety, depression and tension in 
one pair of studies (Steinfurth et al., 2016), and greater anxiety, depression and 
negative affect, and lower positive affect, in the other (McLaughlin et al., 2007). 
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Additionally, Steinfurth et al. found anxiety and tension to be significantly greater 
during worry than rumination. 
Two studies were designed to be able to make inferences regarding later sequelae. 
Kircanksi et al. (2017) found that rumination at one sampling period in the day 
predicted reduced positive and increased negative affect at the next period, for both 
clinical and non-clinical participants. The only significant finding for worry, on the 
other hand, was that it predicted greater negative affect in the non-clinical group 
only. In Dickson et al.’s (2012) study, daily rumination and worry both predicted 
increases in anxiety on subsequent days, but only rumination predicted sadness. 
However, this study used a modified form of the RRS for daily rumination which 
appears to have included three times making specific reference to sadness or 
depression, which may have confounded the findings.  
Two studies examined physiological correlates of rumination and worry.2 Aldao et al. 
(2013) reported that lower heart rate variability (as measured by the average of six 
different heart rate metrics) predicted worry, but not rumination, which might be 
suggestive of greater arousal in worry. However, it should be noted that rumination 
and worry were not separately induced – rather, mood was induced, and levels of 
rumination and worry reported retrospectively, and as noted in section 3.4.5 Affective 
sequelae and physiological correlates above, the associations between mood and type of 
thought were not as excepted, leading to some uncertainty about the reliability of 
these findings. Steinfurth et al. (2016; Study 2) in contrast, found no differences in 
heart rate (rather than HRV) or skin conductance during induced rumination and 
worry, although they did find a greater startle relax (as measured by eyeblink 
potentiation) during one of three time points for worry.  
Taken together, these results add further evidence for the negative effects of both 
rumination and worry on mood, with a possible greater association of worry with 
anxiety and rumination with sadness. They offer some very tentative support for 
greater arousal during worry than rumination, but the findings are limited and may 
                                                
2  See sections 4.1.1.2 Focus on the self above, and 4.1.5 Functions below, for details of 
Steinfurth et al.’s (2016) findings relating to neural correlates. 
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not be reliable. They also suggest the possibility that rumination may have a greater 
impact than worry on later mood.  
3.4.6. Functions 
Four studies aimed to test one or more aspects of theories that propose that 
rumination and/or worry serve a function of enabling avoidance of one type or 
another. Rumination has been suggested to serve functions of both behavioural 
avoidance (i.e., avoiding activities; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) and cognitive 
avoidance (i.e., avoiding aversive mental states; Moulds et al., 2007). Avoidance 
theories of worry include a cognitive avoidance theory (e.g., avoiding threat imagery 
through abstract, verbal thinking; Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006), and a contrast 
avoidance theory (i.e., avoiding an aversive contrast between negative and positive 
emotional states by maintaining a negative state much of the time; Newman & Llera, 
2011) 
Dickson et al. (2012) took daily measures of behavioural and cognitive avoidance, 
rumination and worry, and sad and anxious mood. The following temporal patterns 
emerged. Higher levels of cognitive avoidance were followed by higher levels of 
rumination and worry; they were also followed by greater subsequent sadness and 
anxiety. Rumination mediated the effect of cognitive avoidance on sadness and 
anxiety, whereas worry only mediated the effect on anxiety. Behavioural avoidance 
predicted anxiety only, and there were no mediation effects. They interpret these 
results as evidence for the cognitive avoidance theory, suggesting that rumination and 
worry emerge as attempts to avoid distressing internal experiences (by presumed use 
of an abstract, verbal thinking style), but that attempts to suppress distressing issues 
prolong repetitive thinking and are ultimately unsuccessful.  
Other tests of a cognitive model of avoidance, however, provided little supportive 
evidence. Goldwin and Behar (2012) aimed to test the cognitive avoidance theory of 
worry by examining the relationships between verbal and abstract thinking. They 
predicted that if reduced concreteness enables reduced imagery, an association 
should be found between low concreteness and low imagery. They found no such 
association in either worry or rumination. Steinfurth et al. (2016) tested the cognitive 
and contrast avoidance models by examining neural correlates of worry (with 
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rumination included as a contrast measure of negative emotional thinking). Using 
fMRI imaging, they found both rumination and worry to be associated with 
increased activity in brain regions reported to be involved in processing and 
imagining emotional events, perception of feelings, and the recall and generation of 
emotions3. They suggest that the evidence for emotional processing supports the 
contrast avoidance theory, rather than the cognitive avoidance theory (which would 
predict less emotional processing). Kircanski et al. (2017) tested the contrast 
avoidance model of worry in GAD, predicting that worry would not be followed by 
changes in affect if its purpose is to maintain a poor mood at all time. They found 
this to hold true for the clinical group, which included participants with GAD, but 
not the non-clinical group. 
Overall, these findings offer some limited support for rumination and worry serving a 
function of avoidance, although none is designed to provide a strong test of theories. 
The evidence regarding cognitive avoidance is somewhat conflicting: Dickson et al.’s 
study suggests a potential role for rumination and worry in attempting to prolong 
cognitive avoidance, while Steinfurth et al. find evidence of emotional processing 
during rumination and worry, while a proposed association between verbal and 
abstract thought was not found (Goldwin & Behar, 2012). There is some very limited 
evidence in support of a contrast avoidance model. As findings are broadly similar for 
rumination and worry, there is no clear evidence of differences between them. There 
was no evidence for a function of behavioural avoidance, but no strong tests of this 
were carried out. 
3.4.7. Group differences 
Three studies included analyses of differences between clinical and non-clinical 
samples. 
Aldao et al. (2013) found that neither depression nor GAD was a significant predictor 
of rumination or worry during emotional manipulations. Again, this is an unexpected 
finding that casts some doubt on the extent to which rumination and worry were 
accurately measured in the study. 
                                                
3  The inferior temporal gyrus and the insula 
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Kircanski et al. (2015, 2017), in contrast, did find higher levels of day to day 
rumination and worry in clinical participants. They report a a small number of other 
differences between clinical and non-clinical groups: rumination was more 
unpleasant for the clinical group, and associated with abstract thought only for the 
non-clinical group; worry was more strongly associated with a future orientation for 
the clinical group; as noted above, the pattern of association between significant 
events and subsequent rumination and worry was reversed; and event stressfulness 
predicted rumination only for the clinical group. Overall, while there is clear 
evidence for greater levels of rumination and worry in clinical participants, the 
findings do not suggest a discernible pattern of differences in the nature of 
rumination and worry between clinical and non-clinical groups. 
One study compared groups with high trait rumination, high trait rumination and 
worry, and normal levels on both (they were unable to identify a high trait worry only 
group) (McLaughlin et al., 2007). They reported no differences in relation to 
temporal orientation, nature of thoughts, or the relationship of rumination and worry 
with affect. 
4. Discussion 
This review aimed to determine the extent to which direct comparisons of episodes of 
rumination and worry suggest fundamental similarities or differences between them. 
This question is of interest because, while some have argued that that rumination and 
worry are similar but separate forms of RNT, with distinctive forms, functions and 
relationships to anxiety and depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Segerstrom et 
al., 2003), others have proposed that they are more likely to represent the same basic 
process of RNT (e.g., Beckwé et al., 2014; Ehring & Watkins, 2008, p. 193). 
The included studies were highly heterogeneous in terms of the populations under 
study, the specific aims, the conceptualisations and definitions of rumination and 
worry, and the methodology used to answer the research questions. This has meant 
that findings have not often converged on a single issue, and are occasionally 
contradictory, somewhat limiting the answers that can be given. In summary, the 
strongest findings are that worry is more verbal than rumination, that rumination 
and worry both contain past-, present- and future-oriented thoughts, and that 
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rumination and worry are followed by a worsening of mood, both immediately and 
within the following hours or days. There is some poorer quality evidence for a 
greater association between rumination and sadness, and between worry and anxiety 
and arousal. Rumination may be more past-oriented and focused on the self, and 
worry more future-focused, but these findings may have been affected by definitions 
given to participants. Both forms are thinking of likely to be more abstract than 
neutral thinking, but the evidence is contradictory as to whether they differ from 
each other. Additionally, there is further evidence to suggest that clinical populations 
experience higher levels of rumination and worry, but there was no clear overall 
pattern to any differences between RNT in clinical and non-clinical groups. 
4.1. Key findings 
4.1.1. Content 
4.1.1.1. Temporal orientation 
Several studies suggested that rumination is more past-oriented, and worry more 
future-oriented. This is supported by three studies finding significant differences 
(Kircanski et al., 2015; Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999; Watkins et al., 2005), two 
studies that report differences without significance tests (Goldwin & Behar, 2012; 
McLaughlin et al., 2007), and one study showing greater activation of brain regions 
associated with memory during rumination (Steinfurth et al., 2016). However, none 
of these studies suggested that rumination and worry had a single temporal 
orientation; both appeared to contain a mix of past-, present- and future-oriented 
content. Importantly, the findings risk having been influenced by the fact that all but 
one study (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999) included temporal orientation in the 
definitions of rumination and/or worry given to participants. 
4.1.1.2. Focus on the self 
There was preliminary evidence for rumination being more self-focused than worry. 
The most direct evidence comes from a finding of naturally occurring rumination, 
but not worry, being associated with thoughts rated as being about “myself” 
(Kircanski et al., 2015), but the definition for rumination in this had a greater focus 
on self than that for worry. Additionally, an fMRI study showed greater activation in 
  51 
brain regions associated with self-referential thinking and autobiographical memory 
during rumination (Steinfurth et al., 2016).  
4.1.2. Mentation style 
4.1.2.1. Abstract vs concrete thought 
There was further evidence to support previous research findings that rumination 
and worry are more abstract than other forms of thinking, and this comes from 
experimenter ratings of reported thought content (2012). Evidence on whether 
rumination and worry differ in this respect was contradictory (Goldwin & Behar, 
2012; Kircanski et al., 2015), and no conclusions can be drawn. 
4.1.2.2. Verbal thought vs imagery 
Probably the strongest finding of the review was that worry appears to be 
characterised by more verbal and less imagery-based thought than rumination. This 
conclusion is supported by three studies with widely varying methodologies (Goldwin 
& Behar, 2012; Kircanski et al., 2015; Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999). Two further 
studies in one paper purport to show this, although the statistical analyses are unclear 
(McLaughlin et al., 2007; Studies 1 & 2). This finding is unlikely to have been 
influenced by definitions given to participants. 
4.1.3. Perceptions and beliefs 
Findings relating to perceptions of rumination and worry as uncontrollable were too 
contradictory to enable conclusions to be drawn, as were findings of beliefs about 
their value in helping solve problems. In general, findings concerning appraisals of 
rumination and worry were contradictory, suggesting that methodological differences 
are likely to have had a significant impact on findings. 
4.1.4. Affective sequelae and physiological correlates 
In line with previous findings, there was evidence for both rumination and worry 
affecting mood negatively, both at the time (Steinfurth et al., 2016) (McLaughlin et 
al., 2007) and subsequently (Dickson et al., 2012; Kircanski et al., 2017), with a 
possibility that rumination has a greater subsequent over longer periods (Kircanski et 
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al., 2017). Worry, as compared with rumination, may be more strongly associated 
with anxiety (Steinfurth et al., 2016) and physiological arousal (Aldao et al., 2013; but 
note that this study had flaws limiting confidence in the conclusions). Rumination 
may be more associated with sadness, but this may be confounded by the 
measurement tool (Dickson et al., 2012). 
4.1.5. Functions 
Overall, support for avoidance theories of rumination and worry was limited and 
contradictory, and no strong conclusions can be drawn. There was conflicting 
evidence regarding the idea that worry and rumination enable cognitive avoidance of 
aversive states. One study (Dickson et al., 2012) found a temporal pattern of higher 
reported cognitive avoidance predicting subsequent rumination and worry, and also 
predicting later depressed mood (mediated by rumination) and anxiety (mediated by 
rumination and worry). It was suggested that this indicates that rumination and 
worry represent unsuccessful attempts to prolong avoidance (but with some lack of 
clarity on the mechanism by which this might be working). Other studies variously 
found evidence for emotional processing during rumination and worry, which 
suggests that cognitive avoidance is not taking place (Steinfurth et al., 2016), and no 
evidence for a hypothesised association between verbal and abstract thinking styles 
that might enable avoidance of aversive imagery (Goldwin & Behar, 2012). This, and 
a finding that worry did not predict subsequent negative mood (for participants with 
GAD only; Kircanski et al., 2017), offer more support for a contrast avoidance theory 
(i.e., maintaining a high level of negative mood to avoid painful contrast with positive 
mood), but are far from conclusive. As findings were broadly similar for rumination 
and worry, there is no clear evidence of differences between them. 
4.2. Analysis and future directions 
Overall, although this review has been able to identify similarities and differences 
between rumination and worry in a few key areas, it has been difficult to draw very 
many confident conclusions. Across the studies as a whole there are many findings of 
differences between the two, but so many comparisons have been made that some 
may be down to chance, while genuine but smaller effects may have been missed by 
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underpowered studies. The methodologies and measurements are too varied to allow 
any form of meta-analysis to overcome these limitations. 
One factor that may have led to some of the contradictory findings is the wide 
variation in how rumination and worry are defined across the studies. This gives rise 
to two related questions: whether the definitions and instructions given to 
participants contaminate the findings, and whether the studies are examining the 
same constructs. 
The possible contamination of findings is a particular risk in the findings relating to 
temporal orientation, given that many of the studies explicitly incorporate this in 
their definitions. Interestingly, most studies that consider temporal orientation have 
findings that indicate that both rumination and worry include a mix of past-, present- 
and future-oriented thoughts. While this is not implausible, it does raise the question 
of whether research that explicitly defines rumination and worry in terms of their 
temporal orientation is studying what it intends to. 
More generally, this variability in definitions (and also in other aspects of 
methodology) may mean that the studies are not all examining the same pair of 
constructs. It is not all clear, for example, that instructing people to report on 
‘‘mulling things over in our heads about things that have happened to us” (Aldao et 
al., 2013) and on “depressive thoughts” (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999), for example, 
will provide information on the same type of thought processes. Some of the worry 
item in Watkins et al.’s study (Watkins et al., 2005) more closely resemble the self-
focused, past-oriented thought said to characterise rumination (e.g., “that I am not 
loved”, “that I haven’t achieved much”), meaning that findings from this study may 
not generalise to other conceptualisations of rumination and worry. 
These difficulties in interpretation point to a more fundamental problem with the 
question posed, in this review and elsewhere, of whether rumination and worry are 
essentially the same or different processes. They have been conceptualised, defined, 
theorised and investigated to some degree in isolation from each other in the 
literature, and have acquired an accepted set of characteristics as a result that may 
serve to obscure the exact question being asked. The question “Are rumination and 
worry different?” potentially conflates several different questions: 
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• Is RNT about past and present problems different from RNT about future 
problems? 
• Is the RNT that occurs when people feel low in mood different from RNT that 
occurs when they feel anxious or threatened? 
• Is the RNT that leads to depression different from the RNT that leads to anxiety? 
• Is self-focused RNT different from RNT focused on external concerns? 
• Is RNT that is intended to gain insight into why things happened different from 
RNT that is intended to prevent future difficulties? 
The risk, then, is that studies that suggest evidence for differences between 
rumination and worry on one of these dimensions are taken as evidence for reliable 
differences that apply to somewhat different conceptualisations of the two constructs. 
Future research in this area would therefore benefit from greater clarity on the 
constructs being examined. This might lead to answers that can better be used to 
support the development of interventions for RNT in mood and anxiety disorders. 
The content of this review is, of course, limited by the content of published papers 
comparing rumination and worry directly. However, much of the research on 
rumination and on worry separately, particularly in recent years, has also focused on 
the underpinning cognitive processes that are believed to play an important role in 
the development and of maintenance of these forms of thinking. These include 
emotional processing biases (e.g., attentional biases to negative information, and a 
tendency to interrupt information negatively), and deficits in working memory, 
attentional shifting and inhibition (Cohen, Daches, Mor, & Henik, 2014; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011; Whitmer & 
Gotlib, 2013). Direct comparisons of rumination and worry in relation to these 
processes might offer greater insight into the extent to which they are underpinned 
by fundamentally similar or different mechanisms, which could also inform the 
development of appropriate interventions. 
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5. Limitations 
A significant limitation of this review is the quality assessment process. The quality 
assessment tool was intentionally broad in focus, with general guidelines rather than 
clearly defined criteria for scoring, in order to allow for rating of heterogeneous 
studies on a single scale. However, this inevitably increases the subjectivity of the 
tool, and the discrepancies in ratings for the two papers that were assessed by a 
second rater suggests that its reliability was not as good as hoped (although the ICC 
rating was technically considered “fair”, at .44 it appears rather low). Moreover, 
there was no weighting for the separate items. As all papers scored well for many 
aspects (such as having a clearly defined aim), most papers scored quite highly, and 
important differences in the quality of methodology and analysis may be have been 
obscured. 
A further limitation is the selection of studies by a single reviewer. As there as some 
ambiguity in the criterion of “episodes of rumination and worry”, as indicated by the 
need for very close consideration for six papers described in section 3.1 Results above, 
confirmation of inclusion and exclusions decisions, at least for the more marginal 
decisions, would increase confidence in the decisions. 
6. Conclusion 
By examining studies that directly compare rumination and worry, this review added 
further evidence for similarities and differences between the two that align with 
findings from studies of rumination and worry carried out separately. Overall, it 
suggests that there are a small number of meaningful differences between the two 
constructs as they are currently defined. However, very few findings were supported 
by high quality evidence from multiple studies, and in some cases they were 
contradicted by findings in other studies within the review. Some findings are likely 
to have been contaminated by definitions given to participants. The studies were too 
heterogeneous in terms of methodology, populations, quality and, most importantly, 
definitions and conceptualisations of rumination and worry, to be able to draw 
confident conclusions as to whether they are, in essence, instances of the same or 
different processes. 
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More fundamentally, conceptualisation of rumination and worry as different 
constructs is likely to have shaped the findings of much of the literature. There is a 
risk that findings based on one conceptualisation may be over-extended to other 
conceptualisations. Future research in this area would benefit from greater clarity 
about what is being investigated, and how far the findings can be extended to 
different models of repetitive negative thinking. 
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Background and aims: Worry is associated with deficits in attentional control that 
are thought to contribute to its persistence. Training to improve attentional control 
could therefore lead to a reduction in worry. The study aimed to employ a training 
procedure (previously used to reduce rumination) to reduce worry, and to test two 
competing theories regarding the mechanism of change: 1) that training improves 
attentional control (specifically, the ability to inhibit threatening material), resulting 
in a greater ability to stop worrying; or 2) that attentional resources are briefly 
depleted during training, reducing the processing of threatening stimuli and limiting 
their effect on mood, resulting in lower levels of worry 
Method: Sixty-nine participants were randomly assigned to a training or a control 
group. Both groups completed a training procedure consisting of flanker trials 
(congruent and incongruent), passively-viewed pictures and a colour discrimination 
task. For the training group, the incongruent flankers, which recruit attentional 
control, primarily preceded threatening pictures. For the control group, incongruent 
flankers primarily preceded neutral pictures. In a worry transfer task, participants 
worried for a period before attempting to stop. Additional tasks assessed attentional 
control and tested predictions arising from the competing theories. 
Results: There was no difference between groups in ability to stop worrying. No 
clear group differences emerged during training, and there were no group differences 
in attentional control following training. The control group showed a greater 
reduction in positive mood following training, but there were no group differences in 
negative mood change. Mood emerged as a partial predictor of the ability to stop 
worrying. 
Conclusions: Contrary to predictions, the training procedure did not lead to a 
reduction in worry. There was no good evidence to support the theory that training 
improved attentional control. There was some very limited support for the theory 
that the training group showed reduced processing of threat pictures during training. 
Reasons for the findings, including the possibility that the materials were not well-
suited to the task, are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Worry is a cognitive process characterised by poorly controlled, negative thoughts 
about an uncertain future outcome (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 
1983). Excessive worry, which is central to generalised anxiety disorder (GAD; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013), is associated with a range of negative 
outcomes (Llera & Newman, 2010; Szabó, 2011). Although it is typically experienced 
as aversive, it can nevertheless be highly persistent (Ruscio et al., 2005). 
It has been suggested that the persistence of worry may be linked to underlying 
maintaining cognitive processes (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009). In particular, 
theoretical models of persistent anxiety (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) 
and worry (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) give a central role to deficits in attentional 
control. Attentional control involves a number of key processes (Miyake et al., 2000), 
two of which may be of particular relevance to worry (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011): 
an inhibiting process whereby irrelevant stimuli or responses are prevented from 
disrupting the task at hand, and a shifting process, whereby attentional focus is 
moved to different task-relevant stimuli as needed. Experimental evidence shows that 
worry disrupts attentional control in people with high levels of habitual worry (Hayes, 
Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008) and in people with GAD (Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, 
Adlam, & Coker, 2014). Furthermore, people who report higher levels of worry 
demonstrate poorer attentional control in the face of threatening distractors, while 
poorer attentional control is associated with more intrusive worry thoughts (Fox, 
Dutton, Yates, Georgiou, & Mouchlianitis, 2015). People who worry excessively thus 
have a relatively impaired ability to employ attentional control strategies in the face 
of threat, and this deficit is presumed to contribute to intrusive worry.  
Attentional control can be improved using training tasks that require repeated 
attentional shifting or inhibition (Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 2001; 
Kramer, Larish, & Strayer, 1995), and there is some evidence that this can lead to 
improvements in the ability to control repetitive negative thinking. Two studies have 
demonstrated an effect on rumination, a form of poorly controlled negative thinking 
with many similarities to worry (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, 
Turk, & Heimberg, 2002): Cohen, Mor, and Henik (2015) used inhibitory training to 
reduce rumination, while Siegle et al. (2014) demonstrated that adding attentional 
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control training to treatments for depression led to greater decreases in in 
rumination. However, the evidence that attentional control training can reduce 
worry is more limited. Fox et al. (2015) trained participants using an inhibitory 
training task, but they did not worry significantly less than controls in a subsequent 
worry transfer task.  
Fox et al.’s (2015) study employed emotionally neutral materials in the training 
procedure. Given that worry is particularly associated with deficits in the ability to 
control attention to threat, it is possible that training with threat-related materials 
would be more effective. Cohen et al.’s (2015) inhibitory training procedure to reduce 
rumination took this approach, using sad emotional stimuli (rumination being 
particularly associated with dysphoria; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008). The inhibitory training was achieved by use of a flanker task, which requires 
participants to identify a target stimulus flanked by distractor stimuli (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974). Flanker stimuli may be congruent (distractors are the same as the 
target) or incongruent (distractors differ from the target); responding correctly to 
incongruent flankers requires greater attentional control to inhibit the conflicting 
information. In Cohen et al.’s training, flankers preceded either a negative or a 
neutral picture, followed by a colour discrimination task. The training group and 
control group were both exposed to the same number of negative and neutral 
pictures, and the same number of incongruent and congruent flankers. However, in 
the training condition, incongruent flanker trials frequently preceded negative 
pictures. Over the course of training, the training group showed a significant 
decrease in the time taken to make colour discrimination decisions following negative 
pictures, while the control group did not. Cohen et al. interpret this as evidence for 
increased attentional control in the training group, leading to a greater ability to 
inhibit negative information, so that the negative pictures did not slow down the 
subsequent colour discrimination tasks as much. In a subsequent rumination transfer 
task, the training group reported less rumination than controls.  
Potentially, this training paradigm could be adapted to use threat materials to 
improve control over worry. However, there is some reason to doubt Cohen et al.’s  
(2015) assertion that attentional control is being trained. In their paradigm, the 
flanker decision is made before the presentation of the picture – that is, attentional 
control is recruited prior to exposure to the negative stimulus. It is not clear how this 
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would result in recruitment of attentional control following the onset of a naturally 
occurring negative stimulus, which would be necessary if attentional control is to be 
used to inhibit a response to such a stimulus. A possible alternative explanation is that 
the depletion of attentional resources resulting from an incongruent flanker task leads 
to reduced processing of the stimulus that immediately follows it. This would mean 
that the training group had processed the negative pictures less than the control 
group, as they had more incongruent flankers preceding the negative pictures. This 
could lead to a relatively poorer mood in the control group, which in turn could give 
rise to group differences in the rumination transfer task. Cohen et al. reported no 
group differences in mood changes after training, but do report further analyses that 
show some interaction of training condition and mood on rumination, which suggests 
there may have been some more subtle effects on mood. Furthermore, their 
rumination transfer task consisted of a period of remembering an upsetting event, 
followed by a period of sitting quietly, then completing a questionnaire reporting 
levels of rumination in that moment. It is arguably more a test of the tendency to 
ruminate when given the opportunity to dwell on unpleasant events, than a test of  
the ability to deliberately exert control to stop rumination, and hence not an ideal 
test of improvement in attentional control. 
The distinction between these explanations of Cohen et al.’s (2015) findings is 
important. A training procedure that improves the ability to inhibit negative material 
and thereby reduce repetitive negative thinking could be of some clinical significance, 
offering the possibility of new interventions to reduce distressing and potentially 
harmful worry in people with anxiety disorders. A procedure that temporarily limits 
processing of threatening materials, on the other hand, would not be clinically 
valuable. Distinguishing between these competing theories is therefore of some 
consequence. 
1.1. Current study 
The current study aimed to determine whether Cohen et al.’s (2015) training 
paradigm can be employed to reduce worry, and to test two competing theories of 
the mechanism of change: 1) that training improves attentional control (specifically, 
the ability to inhibit threatening material), resulting in a greater ability to stop 
worrying; or 2) that attentional resources are briefly depleted during training, 
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reducing the processing of threatening stimuli and limiting their effect on mood, 
resulting in lower levels of worry. 
Participants, allocated to either a training group or a control group, completed blocks 
of trials consisting of a flanker, a picture and a colour discrimination decision. All 
participants were presented with 50% incongruent flankers and 50% congruent, and 
with 50% threat pictures and 50% neutral. In the training condition, the incongruent 
flankers were predominantly followed by threat pictures. In the control condition, the 
incongruent flankers were predominantly followed by neutral pictures. Control over 
worry was assessed by a task in which participants worried, then attempted to stop. 
Mood was assessed before and after training. Two novel tasks were introduced to test 
mechanisms of change. An attentional control transfer task (similar to the training 
task) tested whether attentional control was improved as a result of training: threat 
and neutral pictures were presented before the flankers, to see how much threat 
pictures slowed down responses to flankers. A forced choice recognition task was also 
added, in which participants were shown pictures used in the preceding tasks, 
interspersed with distractor items, and asked whether they had seen them before; this 
was intended to test whether the groups had processed the pictures to different 
extents during training. 
1.1.1. Hypothesis concerning reduction in worry 
It was hypothesised that the training group would report fewer negative thoughts in 
the worry transfer task than the control group. 
1.1.2. Hypotheses concerning mechanisms of change 
1.1.2.1. If training improves attentional control 
The following additional hypotheses can be made if threat training results in 
improved attentional control to inhibit threat stimuli: 
In the training task, there will be an interaction between training block (i.e., the first 
and last blocks of trials) and training condition for colour discrimination speeds 
following negative pictures (negative pictures are expected to slow down the colour 
discrimination decisions that immediately follow them; both groups are expected to 
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get faster by the last block of trials due to practice effects; but the training group are 
expected to improve more as their attentional control improves) 
In the attentional control transfer task, the training group will show less emotional 
interference than the control group (where emotional interference is the difference 
between flanker response speeds following threat and neutral pictures: the more that 
threat pictures slow flanker decision speeds, the greater the emotional interference; if 
attentional control is better, there should be less emotional interference) 
1.1.2.2. If training involves reduced processing of threat pictures 
The following additional predictions can be made if training involves reduced 
processing of threat pictures (and, similarly, if the control condition involves reduced 
processing of neutral pictures, as these primarily follow incongruent flankers for this 
group): 
• In the training task, the training group will have faster speeds on colour 
discrimination decisions after threat pictures than the control group, across all 
trials of the training task (because they are processing the threat pictures less 
thorough the task) 
• Following the training, the control group will show greater increases in negative 
mood and greater reductions in positive mood than the training group (as they 
will have processed the threat pictures more) 
• Post-training mood will predict performance on the worry transfer task (as this is 
the main mechanism by which differences in worry arise) 
• The training group will perform less well in recognising threat pictures (as they 
will have processed them less), while the control group will perform less well at 
recognising neutral pictures1 (as they will have processed them less) 
                                                
1  Taking into account the likelihood that threat pictures would in general be recognised 





The design was a between-subjects experimental design, in which participants were 
randomly allocated to either a training group or a control group. The training task 
involved completing blocks of trials consisting of a flanker decision, a passively-
viewed picture, and a colour discrimination decision. Both conditions involved equal 
numbers of congruent and incongruent flankers and threat and neutral pictures, but 
in the training condition incongruent flankers were primarily followed by threat 
pictures, while in the control condition incongruent flankers were primarily followed 
by neutral pictures. 
The effectiveness of training in reducing worry was assessed by a worry transfer task 
in which, after a period of induced worry, participants attempted to stop worrying 
while reporting intermittently on the valence of their thoughts (negative or not 
negative). The independent variable was training group (two levels: training and 
control). The dependent variables were the proportion of non-negative thoughts and 
the longest run of non-negative thoughts. 
Additional tasks and analyses were included to test hypotheses concerning the 
mechanisms of any changes resulting from the experimental manipulation. 
2.2. Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the King’s College London Psychiatry, 
Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee (see Appendix 1). As 
participants were exposed to potentially upsetting materials and required to worry, 
they were given an opportunity to raise concerns and were provided with details of 
sources of support. 
2.3. Sample size calculation 
The required sample size calculation was based on detecting a difference between the 
groups in the worry transfer task. As this is a novel task, no previous effect sizes are 
available, but the rumination transfer task used by Cohen et al. (2015) yielded a 
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medium effect size, d = 0.54. The a priori calculation was therefore based on finding 
a medium effect size in a multiple regression with five predictor variables. The 
calculation, set at α = 0.05, power = 0.8, f² = .20, indicated that a sample size of 65 
was required. 
2.4. Participants 
Seventy participants were recruited from staff and students at King’s College London 
and from the wider community, who responded to an advertisement for participants 
for a study into information, attention and worry. Participants were aged 18 or over, 
native or fluent English speakers, with normal vision (corrected if necessary) and 
normal colour vision. Data for one participant from the neutral training condition 
were removed due to equipment failure, leaving 34 participants in the neutral 
training condition and 35 in the threat training condition.  Participant characterises 
are given in See Table 1. 
Table 1  
Participant characteristics by group 
Measure 
Group Possible scores 
Training Control  
Age (years) 25.29 (7.33) 23.32 (3.35) – 
Female:Male 29:6 29:5 – 
PSWQ 50.83 (15.74) 55.97 (8.07) 16 – 80 
DASS21: Depression 10.23 (10.25) 9.71 (9.32) 0 – 42 
DASS21: Anxiety 7.89 (8.61) 7.47 (8.40) 0 – 42 
DASS21: Stress 13.26 (10.11) 14.12 (10.82) 0 – 42 
Initial positive mood 62.24 (19.48) 61.82 (15.88) 0 – 100 
Initial negative mood 25.77 (19.71) 26.49 (18.11) 0 – 100 
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Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
DASS21 = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale short form. Positive and negative mood 
scores from a task designed for this study 
The groups did not differ significantly in age, t(67) = -1.42, p = .16. They did not 
differ significantly in scores on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), t(67) = 1.70, p = .09, and both groups were just at or 
below the cut off of 56 for high anxiety (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). They did not 
differ significantly in scores on the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale short form 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) subscales of depression, t(67) = -0.22, p = .83, anxiety, 
t(67) = -0.20, p = .84, or stress, t(67) = 0.34, p = .73; mean scores for depression were 
just in the mild range (10-13) for the training group and in the normal range for the 
control group; means scores for anxiety for both groups were just below the mild 
range (8-9); and means scores for stress were just below the mild range (15-18) for 
both groups. The groups did not differ significantly on initial positive mood, t(67) = -
0.10, p = .92, or initial negative mood, t(67) = 0.16, p = .88. 
2.5. Training task 
The training task consisted of 384 trials, each comprising a fixation cross, a flanker 
stimulus and response, a passively viewed picture stimulus, and a colour 
discrimination stimulus and response. The trials were presented in eight blocks of 48 
trials each, with a break of at least 15 seconds in between blocks (during which no 
response could be made on the computer). A sample trial is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Example of a training trial in which an incongruent flanker stimulus 
precedes a threat stimulus 
Following Cohen et al.’s (Cohen et al., 2015) paradigm, participants were instructed 
to look at a fixation cross in the centre of a screen, which remained for 1,000 ms. The 
flanker stimulus consisted of a row of five arrows, with participants being instructed 
to press a key as quickly and accurately as possible to indicate the direction in which 
the central arrow was pointing. 50% of trials included a congruent flanker stimulus, 
in which all arrows pointed in the same direction (e.g., →→→→→), and 50% were 
incongruent, in the which the central arrow pointed in the opposite direction from 
the flanking arrows (e.g, →→←→→). All four possible combinations of left–right 
congruent–incongruent sets of arrows were used, in random order. The flanker 
stimulus remained on the screen for up to 1,000 ms or until the participant pressed a 
key with the left middle finger for a left pointing central arrow, or the right middle 
finger for a right pointing central arrow. Another blank screen was presented, for 
1,000 ms minus the reaction time (RT) for the flanker key press. The picture 
stimulus, which remained for 100 ms, was of threat valence in 50% of trials and 
neutral valence in 50%. This was followed by a blank screen for 50 ms. The colour 
discrimination stimulus was either a blue or a green rectangle in the centre of the 










indicate the colour of the rectangle by key press with their index finger, as quickly 
and accurately as possible (allocation of left and right key presses to colour were 
counter-balanced across groups). A inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1,000 ms of blank 
screen concluded each trial. Picture stimuli consisted of 24 of threat pictures and 24 
neutral pictures, presented in random order. Prior to the task, participants completed 
eight practice trials, during which feedback was given on incorrect responses, and 
participants prompted to press the correct key; if no response was given in the time 
the stimulus was on screen, it was re-presented until the correct response was made. 
2.5.1. Training conditions 
All participants were presented with equal numbers of congruent and incongruent 
flankers and threat and neutral pictures. However, for the training group, 83.3% 
(160/192) of the incongruent flankers were followed by a threat picture, and the 
same proportion of congruent flankers were followed by neutral pictures. For the 
control group, the proportions were reversed. This ensured that the training group 
were primarily required to recruit attentional control prior to the presentation of 
threat stimuli. 
2.5.2. Outcome measure 
Performance on the flankers and colour discriminations was measured in reaction 
speed: the reciprocal of the reaction times once converted from milliseconds to 
seconds (1/RT). This is an accepted approach to transforming RT data, which is 
typically highly positively skewed (Whelan, 2010).2 Mean reciprocal scores were 
calculated for each participant in each condition of interest (which varied for the 
different analyses). 
2.6. Worry transfer task 
The worry transfer task tested the effects of training on the ability to stop worrying. 
Participants were first asked to identify a worry topic that was currently particularly 
                                                
2  Preliminary analyses confirmed that the RT was highly skewed, leading to violations of 
the assumptions of linear regression, in particular marked heteroscedasticity. Trimming the 
data by removing outliers did not markedly improve the distributions. After any initial 
exclusion of data, all RT scores were therefore transformed into reciprocal speed scores. 
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negative for them. They were asked a series of questions about the negative aspects of 
the topic to facilitate worry. They were then taken through the instructions, and left 
alone for the remainder of the task. They were required to worry in their usual way 
about the topic for 1 minute, after which a beep sounded on the computer, at which 
point they were to stop worrying. The beep sounded every 10 s thereafter, and the 
word “Thought?” was presented on the screen, prompting participants to indicate 
the valence of their thoughts (negative or not negative) by keypress. This was repeated for 
30 trials over 5 minutes. 
2.6.1. Outcome measures 
Two outcome measures were used for the worry transfer task: the proportion of trials 
rated as not negative, excluding missing trials (a proxy for the the extent to which a 
participant was able to avoid and/or stop negative thoughts), and the longest run of 
trials rated as not negative (a proxy for the ability to sustain the inhibition of negative 
thoughts). Higher scores on both measures would indicate greater attentional control. 
2.7. Attentional control transfer task 
The attentional control transfer task was completed twice. It was administered before 
training to give a baseline measure, then repeated after the training task to examine 
whether training led to a reduction in the negative impact of threat stimuli on 
decision speeds. The task consisted of 48 trials that were very similar to the training 
task, but with the contents reordered so that the picture stimulus came before the 
flanker stimulus, thus consisting of: 1,000 ms fixation cross; 100 ms picture stimulus; 
50 ms blank screen; up to 1,000 ms flanker stimulus and response; 1,000 ms minus 
flanker RT blank screen; up to 2,000 ms colour discrimination stimulus and 
response; 1,000 ms blank screen ITI. As the baseline task was the first time 
participants were introduced to the process, a detailed practice was provided: eight 
practice trials of the colour discrimination task, eight trials of flanker and colour 
discrimination tasks, and eight full trials. They completed a further four full practice 
trials prior to the post-training task. Feedback and corrections were as for the training 
task. 
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2.7.1. Outcome measure 
Flanker decision performance was measured as the response speed (1/RT). 
Additionally, a measure of emotional interference was calculated: the difference 
between flanker response speeds following neutral pictures, and flanker response 
speeds following threat pictures. Colour discrimination performance was not 
analysed; the colour discrimination judgment was included in the task to preserve 
similarity between the tasks and to minimise carry-over effects between trials. 
2.8. Recognition test 
The recognition test examined whether the groups differed in their ability to 
recognise pictures from the training task. Participants were presented with the 
pictures, interspersed with distractor pictures (all in random order), and asked to 
indicate whether or not they thought they had previously seen the pictures and to 
rate their confidence in their response. A fixation cross was presented for 1,000 ms, 
followed by a picture for up to 1,000 ms; participants were instructed to respond 
quickly. They indicated whether they had seen the picture by pressing keys for yes or 
no (counterbalanced across groups between left and right index finger). They were 
then presented with the question “How sure are you about that?” and a visual 
analogue scale (VAS) consisting of a line with 100 tick marks, with a longer central 
tick mark and end marks, labelled Not at all sure at the far left and Very sure at the far 
right. They used the mouse to click on the appropriate point on the line. Stimuli were 
the 24 pictures used only in the training task and 24 distractor items, each one 
matched with a training picture for visual similarity.  
Before starting the task, participants learnt the yes and no keys by responding to the 
words “Yes” and “No”, presented for 10 trials in random order. Incorrect responses 
received an instruction to press the correct key. They then completed four practice 
trials. For the practice trials only, they were given feedback on how they had 
answered, in the form of “You said yes/no, you have/haven’t seen that before”. 
2.8.1. Outcome measures 
Two measures of recognition were calculated: accuracy and confidence. Accuracy 
was measured by calculating d’ scores, a sensitivity measure calculated by subtracting 
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the z score of false alarms (distractor pictures incorrectly identified as having been 
seen before) from the z score of the hit rate (correct identification of training task 
pictures). Confidence ratings were calculated from the mean VAS conscience ratings 
for each participant for threat and neutral pictures. 
2.9. Materials 
2.9.1. Picture stimuli 
All picture stimuli used in the training task, attentional control transfer task and 
recognition task were taken from the International Affective Picture Scale (IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), a set of pictures with normative rating scores for 
valence from 0–9 (least to most happy) and for arousal from 0–9 (least to most 
arousing). In total, 120 pictures were selected, with 60 representing threat and 60 
being neutral. Threat pictures were selected to have low valence (M = 2.98, SD = 
0.59) and moderate to high arousal (M = 5.71, SD = 0.84). Neutral pictures were 
selected to have medium valence (M = 5.49, SD = 0.59) and low arousal (M = 3.36, 
SD = 0.48). Of the subset of threat pictures used in the training task, valence (M = 
2.96, SD = 0.65) and arousal (M = 5.67, SD = 0.90) were similar to that of the total 
threat pictures; the same was true for the valence (M = 5.5, SD = 0.69) and arousal 
(M = 3.40, SD = 0.44) of the neutral training pictures. See Appendix 2 for full details 
of pictures and comparisons. 
2.9.2. Emotional assessment measures 
2.9.2.1. Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
Trait worry was assessed using the PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990), a 16-item self-report 
measure of tendency to worry (see Appendix 3). Each items is a statement about 
worry, scored on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all typical of me) to 5 (Very typical of 
me). These are summed (with positive items reversed scored) to yield a single trait 
worry score between 16 and 80. The scale has good psychometric properties in 
clinical and non-clinical populations (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Molina & 
Borkovec, 1994). Cronbach’s alpha reliability in this sample was .93. 
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2.9.2.2. Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale short form (DASS21) 
The DASS21 is a 21-item self-report measure of depression, anxiety and stress in the 
present and recent past, based on an original 42-item measure (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). It consists of three subscales with seven items in each, rated on the 
extent to which each item has applied over the past week, on a 4-point scale from 0 
(Did not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me very much, or most of the time). Scores for each 
item are doubled (to enable comparison with the full 42 item scale) and summed to 
give three subscale scores from 0–42 each. It has satisfactory psychometric properties 
in clinical and non-clinical populations (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 
1998). Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities in this sample were .89 for depression, .85 for 
anxiety and .90 for stress. 
2.9.2.3. Mood ratings 
A 14 item visual analogue mood rating scale was created using items from the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form ([PANAS-X]; Watson & 
Clark, 1999), with two 7 item subscales, one consisting of positive affect items and 
one of negative affects items (see Appendix 5). The visual analogue scale consisted of 
a line with 100 tick marks; the left end was labelled highly disagree (and scored 0) and 
the right end was labelled highly agree (and scored 100). Scoring was completed by 
clicking on the scale with the mouse. Participants were presented with the statement 
“Currently, I feel” with one of the items, presented in random order, and instructed 
to rate how they felt at that moment. Prior to the first use of the scale, they completed 
two practice items. 
Positive and negative mood scores for each time point were created for each 
participant from the mean scores of each subscale, and a difference score was 
calculated by subtracting the post-training score from the pre-training score. 
Cronbach’s alpha was .90 for the pre-training negative items, .91 for the pre-training 
positive items, .90 for the post-training negative items, and .94 for the post-training 
positive items. 
 93 
2.9.3. Filler task 
A filler task was completed after the training and after the booster training order to 
neutralise mood effects of training and to reduce the effects of fatigue on computer 
tasks. Adapted from the Speed of Comprehension Test (Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-
Smith, 1992), it consisted of a set of statements with a checkbox next to each 
statement; participants indicated whether a statement was true or false by putting a 
tick or cross on the box. Participants were instructed to work at their own pace with 
no pressure to complete all items. Two separate versions were used, each with 100 
statements and a time limit of two minutes. See Appendix 8 for details. 
2.10. Procedure 
One day prior to the session, participants were emailed a link to the pre-session 
questionnaires (demographic questions, PSWQ and DASS21 ) to complete before 
attending. On arrival, they were given an overview of the session, with the 
opportunity to ask questions, and invited to sign an informed consent form (see 
Appendix 3). All tasks except the filler task were presented on a standard 15” laptop 
using ePrime software. Participants completed the mood ratings, the baseline 
attentional control transfer task, and the training task (during which the experimenter 
left the room). The filler task was then administered, followed by the attentional 
control transfer task, the recognition task, 24 booster training trials, and the second 
version of the filler task. The experimenter then induced worry, explained the worry 
transfer task, and left the room for the duration of the task. In order to check for 
demand effects, participants were asked, “Do you have any thoughts or ideas as to 
what the study was about?”; following a debriefing, they were asked, “So is that what 
you thought the study was about?” (due to experimenter error, this check was only 
introduced approximately halfway through the study). Participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions, before being given £15 to compensate for their time 
and expenses. Sessions lasted for approximately 1.5 hours. An overview of the key 
session tasks is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Overview of the key session tasks 
2.11. Data analysis plan 
In several of the analyses (training task, attentional control transfer task, recognition 
task), the repeated measures (flanker congruence, picture valence, training block) 
were nested within participants. In these cases, the analyses were completed using 
multilevel linear modelling, with the repeated measures at Level 1 and the 
participants at level 2. Where appropriate, PSWQ scores were included as a random 
effect. Continuous variables were centred around grand means to reduce the 
potential influence of multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2005). Additional 
analyses for the training task were carried out using paired t tests and simple linear 
regression. The worry transfer task, and one analysis within the attentional control 
transfer task, did not contain nested data, and were therefore analysed using multiple 
regression. Differences in pre- and post-training mood scores between the training 
and control groups were compared using independent t tests. 
Main effect sizes using Cohen’s d were calculated from the estimated marginal means 
for multilevel linear modelling analyses, and from actual means for t tests. Cohen’s f² 
was calculated for multiple regressions. All post-analysis data were examined for 
potential violations of the assumptions of regression analyses, including non-linearity, 
non-normality of residuals, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity; any marked 
































3.1. Data preparation 
For analyses of the flanker and discrimination data, missed and inaccurate3 trials 
were removed from the data. Trials with RTs below 150 ms were excluded as being 
unlikely to reflect genuine decision-making (Whelan, 2010). Trials with extreme 
colour discrimination RTs of greater than 1,500 ms were excluded. No exclusions 
were made for long flanker decisions as they had a maximum response time of 1,000 
ms set by the experimental procedure. Two participants (one from each group) did 
not complete the full training task due to equipment failure; however, the number of 
correctly completed trials completed by these participants was within the range 
completed by the other participants, and their data were therefore retained. Full 
details of data exclusions are given in Appendix 9. In summary: One control group 
participant’s data was excluded from training task analyses, and 10.8% of all 
remaining trials were excluded; data from two control group participants were 
excluded from the mood analysis; 2.2% of all trials were excluded from the 
attentional control transfer task; in the recognition task, 1.42% of all trials were 
excluded, and data from one training group participant were also excluded. 
In the worry transfer task, preliminary analyses revealed that 4.5% trials were 
missing, and that these were unevenly spread across trials, with 44.9% first trials 
missing (41.2% of the control group and 48.6% training group). The longest run of 
initial missing trials was four. No data were excluded. 
In the mood task, several participants had perfect hit rates and/or false positives. 
When this is the case, the d’ accuracy score cannot be calculated. The data were 
subjected to a log linear transformation by adding 0.5 to the hit and false alarm 
scores, and 1.0 to the total number of familiar and new pictures rated by each 
participant (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). 
                                                
3  Point-biserial correlations between accuracy and RTs in the training tasks and 
attentional control transfer tasks indicated that there was no evidence for a speed-accuracy 
trade-off 
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3.2. Training task 
In order to facilitate comparisons with Cohen et al.’s (2015) study, the same 
predictions were tested (although different data analytic approaches were used in 
some cases). Additional analyses were also carried out. 
3.2.1. Preliminary analysis: Recruitment of attentional control 
To check that attentional control was being recruited by the incongruent flankers 
(and thus that this aspect of the task was working correctly), an analysis was carried 
out of flanker response speeds. As no hypotheses relevant to the study questions were 
being tested, the full results are given in Appendix 10. In summary, the usual effect of 
slower speeds for incongruent flankers was found, indicating that attentional control 
was being recruited as intended. As expected, no group differences were found, 
suggesting that the flankers recruited attentional control equally for both groups. 
3.2.2. Preliminary analysis: Effects of valence and congruence on 
colour discrimination 
In line with Cohen et al.’s (2015) analysis, the effects of flanker congruence and 
picture valence on colour discrimination task were examined. This matters because 
differences in colour discrimination speeds following threat pictures are used as an 
indicator of differences between the groups, but the groups also differ in the 
combinations of flanker congruence and pictures valence to which they were 
exposed. If, as Cohen et al. found, negative pictures only slow down colour 
discrimination speeds in congruent flanker trials, it would not be possible to make a 
meaningful direct comparison between groups of the effect of valence on speed. To 
test for this effect, a multilevel linear modelling analysis was carried out with colour 
discrimination speed as the dependent variable, and flanker congruence (congruent, 
incongruent), picture valence (threat, neutral) and their interaction as predictors. 
There was no significant effect of valence (b = -0.02, SE = 0.01, p = .11), congruence 
(b = -0.00, SE = 0.01, p = .82), or the interaction between congruence and valence (b 
= -0.01, SE = 0.02, p = .71). The interaction effect that Cohen et al. found was thus 
not found in this study, which meant that a direct comparison of group differences on 
colour discrimination speeds was possible. 
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3.2.2.1. Additional analyses 
The results of the above analysis also suggest, unexpectedly, that colour 
discrimination decisions were not significantly slowed by negative pictures. Because 
this was not anticipated, further unplanned analyses were carried out using the IAPS 
valence scores of individual pictures. Full details are in Appendix 11. In summary, 
there was a small overall effect of valence score across all pictures, but no effect 
within each valence group (i.e., no effect of valence score within the set of threat 
pictures, nor within the set of neutral pictures). The valence of pictures thus did not 
affect subsequent colour discrimination speeds to the extent that was expected. 
3.2.3. Testing for training of attentional control 
If Cohen et al. (2015) are correct that attentional control is being trained, the training 
group should show a greater improvement in colour discrimination speeds following 
negative pictures over the course of training than the control group. Both groups are 
expected to get faster because of practice effects, but the training group should show 
a greater improvement because their attentional control is improving as the training 
continues, and the negative pictures should slow down their colour discrimination 
times less. There should thus be an interaction between training block and group for 
colour discrimination speeds following negative pictures. 
The training was completed in eight blocks, so speeds in the first and last blocks were 
compared. A multilevel linear modelling analysis was carried out with colour 
discrimination speed as the dependent variable; training group (training, control), 
picture valence (neutral, threat) and training block (first, last) were entered as 
predictors. The results are shown in Table 2.  
The only significant effect was the main effect of training block, with colour 
discrimination responses speeds in the last block being faster (M = 2.13, SD = 0.41) 
than the first (M = 1.96, SD = 0.41), d = 0.36, indicating that participants improved 
their speeds over time. There was no effect of group and thus, in contrast with the 
previous analysis, no evidence for training improving attentional control for the 
training group. No effect was found for valence, alone or in interaction, and thus no 
evidence to suggest the threat stimuli significantly interfered with colour 
discrimination for either group. This offers no support for the idea that the training 
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group showed improved attentional control as training progressed, but also (as 
suggested by the valence analyses described above), implies that threat pictures did 
not impact on colour discrimination speeds.  
Table 2  
Training task: Multilevel modelling results for effects of group, picture valence and training block on 




SE(b) p value 95% CI 
Group 0.08 0.09 .36 -0.09, 0.25 
Valence -0.01 0.04 .70 -0.09, 0.06 
Group x Valence -0.05 0.05 .40 -0.15, 0.06 
Block 0.20 0.04 .00 0.12, 0.27 
Group x Block -0.06 0.05 .27 -0.17, 0.05 
Valence x Block -0.04 0.05 .45 -0.15, 0.06 
Group x Valence x Block 0.08 0.08 .29 -0.07, 0.23 
Note: Significant results highlighted in bold. 
Cohen et al. were unable to compare the groups directly in this way because, as 
noted above, they had found a moderating effect of flanker congruence on the 
impact of negative pictures on colour discrimination. They therefore carried out a 
paired t test for each group, comparing colour discrimination RTs for the first and 
second halves of the training. Although a finding of significant differences within 
groups is not evidence for a significant difference between them (Gelman & Stern, 
2006), this analysis was also completed here to enable a direct comparison with 
Cohen et al.’s study. The reduction in RTs4 was significant for the training group (M 
= 34.4, SD = 52.7, 95% CI [16.3, 52.5], t(32) = 3.86, p = .001, d = 0.65. The 
reduction in RTs for the control group was not significant (M = 16.7, SD = 59.6, 
95% CI [-4.4, 37.9], t(32) = 1.61, p = .12, d = .28. This is line with Cohen et al.’s 
                                                
4  RTs were used rather than speeds to maximise the similarity in analyses 
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findings, which they interpreted as suggesting an effect of training on attentional 
control. 
3.2.4. Testing for reduced processing of threat stimuli 
If, instead of improving attentional control, the training involves reduced processing 
of threat stimuli, the training group should show less impact of threat pictures on 
colour discrimination speeds than the control group across all trials. An independent 
t test was carried out with colour discrimination speeds on threat trials as the 
independent variable, and training condition as the dependent variable. The 
difference between speeds for the training group (M = 2.05, SD = 0.33, 95% CI [1.9, 
2.2]) and the control group (M = 2.08, SD = 0.32 , 95% CI [2.0, 2.2]) were not 
significant, t(66) = 0.39, p = .70, d = 0.10. This offers no support for the idea that the 
training group paid less attention to the threat pictures and were therefore less 
affected by them throughout the whole task. 
3.3. Mood  
If training involves reduced processing of threat stimuli, the control group would be 
expected to evidence worse mood following training than the training group, as they 
will have processed the threat pictures more. Independent t tests5 were carried out for 
positive and negative mood change. The control group showed a greater reduction in 
positive mood (M = -7.67, SD = 10.72, 95% CI [-11.5, -3.8]) than the training group 
(M = -1.57, SD = 9.06, 95% CI [-4.7, 1.5]); this difference was significant, t(65) = -
2.52, p = .01, and represented a medium effect size, d = -0.62. However, the control 
group did not show an increase in negative mood (M = 2.17, SD = 13.1, 95% CI [-
2.6, 6.9]) that was significantly greater than that of the training group (M = 0.31, SD 
= 13.01, 95% CI [-4.2, 4.8]), t(65) = -0.58, p = .56, d = 0.14. This offers partial 
support for the prediction of worse mood for the control group. 
                                                
5  Data showed some non-significant deviations from normality; however the shapes of the 
distributions for the positive difference scores were different for the two groups, making use 
of a Mann Whitney U test also potentially unreliable. 
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3.4. Worry transfer task 
Mean scores for the two outcome measures for the worry transfer task, the 
proportion of non-negative thoughts and the longest run of non-negative thoughts, 
for both training conditions are shown in Table 3. The correlation between these 
outcomes measures was r = .72, p = .001. 
Table 3  
Worry transfer task: Means of proportion of non-negative thoughts and longest run of non-negative 




Proportion of non-negative thoughts 0.73 (0.24) 0.69 (0.25) 
Longest run of non-negative thoughts 13.71 (8.90) 12.06 (8.39) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses 
Two hierarchical multiple regressions were carried out, one with each stop worry 
measure as the dependent variable, each with the same predictors6. To test and 
control for an expected effect of trait worry, PSWQ scores were entered into as a 
continuous predictor. To test for an effect of training, group was entered into a 
second model. Finally, to examine whether post-training mood affected performance 
(as would be predicted if any effects of the training task arise from differences in 
emotional processing of threat stimuli, rather than from training attentional control), 
post-training negative and positive mood scores were entered as continuous 
predictors into a third model. 
                                                
6  For both DVs, examination of the data suggested that a small number of observations 
may have exerted excessive influence on the model; the residuals for the model for 
proportion of non-negative thoughts also exhibited significant heteroscedasticity. The models 
were therefore re-run twice for each predictor, first with negative mood removed (as positive 
mood proved to be a better predictor), and again with negative mood and outlier 
observations removed. This did not greatly improve properties of the data. In both cases, the 
overall models remained broadly similar each time, with no major changes in power or 
significance of predictors. The original models were therefore retained, but must be 
interpreted with some caution. 
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The findings for the proportion of non-negative thoughts are shown in Table 4. In 
the first model, PSWQ scores were a significant predictor, with higher PSWQ scores 
predicting poorer performance, with a medium effect size, f² = .18. The second 
model did not add a significant change in R², and training condition was not a 
significant predictor. The third model did add a significant change; in this model, 
positive mood emerged as the only significant predictor in this model, f² = .17. 
Table 5 sets out the findings for the longest run of non-negative thoughts. Again, 
PSWQ scores were a significant predictor in the first model, f² = .21. Neither the 
second nor third models added significantly to the fit, and no further predictors 
emerged. 
There was therefore no support for the prediction that the training group would 
report fewer negative thoughts. There was some support for an effect of mood, as 
would be predicted if differences in processing of threat pictures during the training 
task leads to mood differences that in turn impact on worry. 
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Table 4  
Worry transfer task: Hierarchical regression results for effect of group, PSWQ and post-training mood on proportion of non-negative thoughts 
 Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    
 B SE B β p value B SE B β p value B SE B β p value 
PSWQ -0.01 0.00 -.39 .00 -.01 0.00 -.39 .00 -0.00 0.00 -.14 .30 
Group     -.00 0.06 -.00 .99 0.03 0.05 .05 .62 
Negative mood         0.00 0.00 .09 .58 
Positive mood         0.01 0.00 .51 .01 
Constant 1.11 0.12  .00 1.11 0.12  .00 0.84 0.14  .00 
Note: Step 1 R² = .15 for, F(1, 67) = 12.03, p < .01. Step 2 ΔR² = .00, F(1, 66) = 0.00, p = .99. Step 3 ΔR² = .13, F(2. 64) = 5.73, p < .01. PSWQ = Penn State 




Table 5  
Worry transfer task: Hierarchical regression results for effect of group, PSWQ and post-training mood on longest run of non-negative thoughts 
 Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    
 B SE B β p value B SE B β p value B SE B β p value 
PSWQ -0.29 0.07 -.42 .00 -0.29 0.08 -.42 .00 -0.21 0.09 -.31 .03 
Group     -0.19 1.95 -.01 .92 0.22 1.97 .01 .91 
Negative mood         0.00 0.08 .00 .99 
Positive mood         0.09 0.08 .21 .29 
Constant 28.23 4.11  .00 28.24 4.15  .00 23.85 5.11  .00 
Note: Step 1 R² = .18 for, F(1, 67) = 14.68, p < .01. Step 2 ΔR² = .00, F(1, 66) = 0.01, p = .92. Step 3 ΔR² = .03, F(2. 64) = 1.08, p = .34. PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire. Significant results highlighted in bold.
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3.5. Attentional control transfer task 
3.5.1. Preliminary analysis: Effects of valence and congruence on 
colour discrimination 
The primary outcome measure for the attentional control transfer task was emotional 
interference scores: that is, the difference between flanker decision speeds following 
neutral pictures and following threat pictures, which serves as in indicator of the 
extent to which threat pictures disrupt flanker speeds. It was therefore necessary first 
to determine whether picture valence did effect flanker speeds. Additionally, a 
different study by Cohen, Henik, and Moyal (2012) found that negative stimuli can 
disrupt tasks involving less cognitive effort (i.e., congruent but not incongruent 
flankers); if this turned out to true in this study, it would be necessary to control for 
flanker congruence in the analysis of emotional interference. 
A multilevel linear modelling analysis was carried out, with flanker response speed as 
the dependent variable, and picture valence (threat, neutral), flanker congruence 
(congruent, incongruent) and the interaction between valence and congruence as 
predictors. A significant main effect was found for valence (b = -0.07, SE = 0.02, p = 
.001), with flanker decisions following neutral pictures being faster (M = 2.12, SD = 
0.32) than those following threat pictures (M = 2.07, SD = 0.32), d = 0.14. The 
typical effect of congruence was significant (b = -0.35, SE = 0.02, p < .001), with 
congruent flanker decisions being faster (M = 2.26, SD = 0.32) than incongruent (M 
= 1.93, SD = 0.32), d = 1.03. The interaction between congruence and valence was 
not significant (b = 0.04, SE = 0.03, p = .13). This suggests that negative pictures did 
disrupt flanker decision times, and that (in contrast to the findings from Cohen et al., 
2012), this effect was not limited to congruent flankers. It was therefore possible to 
meaningfully compare group differences in emotional interference in the main 
analysis, with no need to control for flanker congruence. 
3.5.2. Effects of training on emotional interference 
If the training results in improved attentional control, the training group should show 
less emotional interference, as their flanker speeds will be slowed less by threat 
pictures. A multiple linear regression was carried out with emotional interference as 
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the DV, and group (training, control) as a categorical predictor. To control for 
baseline performance and trait worry, emotional interference scores from the 
baseline attentional transfer task (completed before training) and PSWQ scores were 
entered as continuous predictors. Group did not emerge as a significant predictor (β 
= .02, p = .88), and neither did baseline performance (β = .05, p = .69) or PSWQ 
scores (β = .06, p = .65). The overall model fit was R² = .01. There was therefore no 
evidence to support the prediction, made by the improved attentional control theory, 
that the training group showed better attentional control in the transfer task.  
3.6. Recognition task 
Means for both training conditions of the accuracy ratings (d’) and the confidence 
ratings at each picture valence are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6  
Recognition task: Mean d’ accuracy ratings and confidence ratings for each picture valence, by group 
Picture valence d' accuracy scores Confidence scores 
Training  Control  Training Control 
Neutral 1.45 (0.71) 1.45 (0.72) 72.92 (15.05) 71.62 (11.63) 
Threat 0.98 (0.70) 1.14 (0.68) 69.92 (15.33) 72.08 (11.24) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
In general, it would be expected that threat pictures would be recognised more 
readily than neutral pictures because of their more intense valence and arousal 
(Kensinger, 2011). Additionally, if training involves reduced processing of threat 
stimuli, the training group should perform less well in recognising threat pictures, 
while the control group should perform less well at recognising neutral pictures 
(based on the relative attention paid to each picture type during the training task). 
Two multilevel linear modelling analyses were completed, one with d’ accuracy 
scores as the DV, and one with confidence scores as the DV. In each case, the 
predictors were group (training, control), picture valence (threat, neutral), and the 
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interaction between group and valence. The results of both models are set out in 
Table 7. The only significant finding that valence was a predictor of d’ accuracy with 
a medium effect size, d = 0.56; threat pictures were recognised more accurately 
overall. These findings suggests that the task worked as a test of recognition (as threat 
pictures are expected to be recognised more ), but offers no support for the theory 
that groups processed the pictures differently during training. 
Table 7  
Recognition task: Multilevel modelling results for effects of group and picture valence on accuracy and 
confidence measures 
  b SE(b) p value 95% CI 
Group d' accuracy 0.00 0.17 .99 -0.32, 0.33 
 Confidence -1.83 3.20 .57 -8.10, 4.43 
Valence d' accuracy -0.47 0.17 .01 -0.79, -0.14 
 Confidence -3.00 3.15 .34 -9.17, 3.17 
Group x Valence d' accuracy 0.16 0.24 .49 -0.30, 0.62 
 Confidence 3.39 4.52 .45 -5.47, 12.25 
Note: Significant results are highlighted in bold.  
3.7. Demand characteristics 
Of those participants asked whether they had any idea what the study was about 
(approximately half of the total sample), none indicated that they had guessed the 
hypotheses being tested. 
4.  Discussion 
The study had two aims. The first was to determine whether the attentional control 
training paradigm created by Cohen et al. (2015) could be employed to reduce worry 
(rather than rumination, as in the original study). The second was to test two 
competing theories of the mechanism of any such effects: that training improves the 
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ability to use attentional control to inhibit negative stimuli (as argued by Cohen et 
al.), or that the brief depletion of attentional resources during the training task results 
in reduced processing of negative pictures by the training group, such that training 
has more negative impact on the control group’s mood. 
4.1. Effect of training on worry 
The results do not offer any evidence to support an effect of training on worry: the 
worry transfer task, in which participants tried to stop worrying after a period of 
induced worry, revealed no overall differences between the groups. This is in contrast 
to Cohen et al.’s (2015) study, which found an effect of training in a rumination 
transfer task. This raises a number of questions concerning possible explanations for 
these different findings. 
4.1.1. Was the worry transfer task an appropriate test of the ability to 
control worry? 
The worry transfer task is a novel paradigm currently under development, and while 
it has good face validity as a test of the ability to avoid or stop worrying thoughts, 
there is as yet no published literature to support this. However, trait worry as 
measured by the PSWQ predicted performance on the task, indicating that 
participants with a greater tendency worry found it harder to stop worrying. While 
not conclusive, this does suggest that the task can serve as a reasonable test of the 
ability to control worry. 
4.1.2. Did the training task not affect the training and control groups 
differently? 
Group differences in the worry transfer task would only be expected if the training 
task affects the training and control groups differently in some way. Two competing 
theories of how it might do so have been proposed here. Predictions arising from 
both of these were made in relation to performance on the training task, neither of 
which were fully borne out: the training group did not show improvements over time 
in colour discrimination speeds after threat pictures, compared to the control group 
(as it should if the training group’s attentional control improves during training), and 
groups did not differ in colour discrimination speeds after threat pictures throughout 
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the task as a whole (as they should if the training groups is processing the threat 
pictures less). Cohen et al., in contrast, suggest that their study does show evidence 
for an effect within training. A number of differences between the studies that could 
potentially account for this difference between the two studies are considered here. 
4.1.2.1. Differences in procedure 
The only significant difference between the studies in procedure prior to training 
(which therefore could have affected training) was that participants in the present 
study completed a baseline version of an attentional control transfer task which was 
similar to the training task, albeit with the components in a different order. As both 
groups completed an identical task, it is unlikely it affected the groups’ performance 
on the training task differentially. It is possible that some cognitive fatigue made the 
training less effective, but the baseline task was short (approximately five minutes). 
Furthermore, there was evidence that performance in the training task improved 
over time, suggesting that practice effects outweighed any fatigue effects. 
4.1.2.2. Differences in materials 
The current study found rather limited evidence that picture valence influenced 
subsequent colour discrimination speeds during the training task. If negative pictures 
do not markedly disrupt colour discrimination speeds, it becomes more difficult to 
identify an effect of training. Cohen et al. (2015) do not present data for the effect of 
picture valence alone, so a direct comparison with this study cannot be made, but 
they do report an interaction effect of flanker congruence and picture valence that 
was not found in the current study. It therefore appears that negative pictures in their 
study slowed down colour discrimination speeds in a way that they did not in the 
current study. It is possible that a difference in the pictures selected accounts for this: 
the valence of their negative pictures was slightly more negative than those used in 
the current study (M = 2.37 compared to M = 2.96 ; valence scale 0–9). It is 
therefore possible that the pictures in the current study were not negative enough to 
be effective in training. 
However, detailed examination of the effect of valence scores of individual pictures in 
the current study reveals a surprisingly weak relationship between valence and effect 
on colour discrimination speeds. This may arise from differences in the way in which 
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the IAPS pictures were originally rated and the way in which they are used in this 
study. The valence ratings were made after viewing images for 6 s (Lang et al., 2008), 
while in the current study they were viewed for 100 ms, and it seems plausible that 
perception of threat may be quite different at these speeds. While it therefore remains 
possible that negative pictures in this study were less effective than those used by 
Cohen et al., a simple comparison of mean valences is unlikely to be a good measure 
of whether this is the case. 
4.1.2.3. Differences in data analysis 
Cohen et al. (2015) reported that they had demonstrated training effectiveness by 
finding that the training group showed a significant improvement on colour 
discrimination decision times after negative pictures over the course of the training 
(by comparing performance on the first and second halves), while their control group 
had not. The same effect was found using the same analysis in the current study, and 
could be taken to indicate that the training was effective. However, this is a less than 
ideal way of demonstrating effectiveness, as a finding of significant differences within 
groups is not evidence for a significant difference between them (Gelman & Stern, 
2006). 
Cohen et al. used this approach because they found a moderating effect of flanker 
congruence on the emotional interference caused by negative stimuli; the different 
contingencies for flanker congruence and picture valence between the groups would 
have confounded a direct comparison. Because that moderating effect was not found 
here, it was possible to also conduct a more rigorous analysis involving a direct 
comparison between groups, which showed no significant advantage for the training 
group. As in Cohen et al.’s study, both groups improved over time, but time was the 
only significant predictor, suggesting that practice effects are the most likely 
explanation. 
In summary, the current study replicated Cohen et al.’s finding of an effect by less 
rigorous analysis but not by more rigorous analysis. As the more rigorous analysis 
was not completed with Cohen et al.’s data, it is possible that the training produced 
no true effects either study. 
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4.1.3. Did the training task affect the training and control groups 
differently, but not lead to differences in worry? 
Although it is, as discussed above, possible that Cohen et al.’s (2015) demonstration 
of training effectiveness is unreliable, they certainly did find a group difference in 
rumination. It could therefore be that there were effects arising from their training 
that transferred to rumination, and that those same effects (too subtle to detect by the 
analyses of training performance) also occurred in this study but did not transfer to 
worry. A number of possible reasons for this are outlined. 
4.1.3.1. Differences between rumination and worry 
If rumination is more susceptible than worry to being influenced by changes resulting 
from training (whether these arise from improved attentional control or reduced 
processing of negative material), then transfer to worry may not occur. Although 
worry is strongly associated with deficits in attentional control, this training paradigm 
specifically targets inhibitory processes, and there is a greater body of research 
evidence linking rumination with inhibitory deficits than there is for worry (Beckwé, 
Deroost, Koster, De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2014). It is possible, then, that inhibitory 
training might transfer more effectively to rumination than to worry.   
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that worry is associated with higher 
levels of verbal thought, and less imagery, than rumination (Goldwin & Behar, 2012; 
Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 2015; Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2003). If this is the case, then the visual stimuli used in the training procedure may be 
less effective in producing an effect that transfers to worry. 
4.1.3.2. Differences in the transfer tasks 
Cohen et al.’s (2015) rumination task required participants to spend a period of time 
remembering an upsetting event, followed by a period of sitting quietly, and then to 
report state rumination on a 10-item visual analogue scale. It is thus largely a 
measure of the tendency to ruminate during that time. The current study required 
participants to worry for a period, then attempt to stop worrying. This may simply be 
a more generally demanding task, requiring greater effects during training to show 
transfer. 
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Alternatively, the worry transfer task may be a more rigorous test specifically of 
attentional control, rather than just a reduced tendency towards negative thinking, in 
that it required participants to make an active attempt to stop worrying following a 
period of thinking about personally threatening material. Deficits in inhibitory 
attentional control (as indicated by poor performance in a flanker task) have been 
shown to correlate with an inability to control negative intrusions in a worry task 
(Fox et al., 2015), suggesting that a task requiring inhibition of intrusions may be a 
good test of attentional control training. If the training task does not, in fact, improve 
attentional control, transfer to a task specifically requiring good attentional control 
might not be found. 
4.1.3.3. Differences in procedure 
Several procedural differences between the current study and Cohen et al.’s (2015) 
study may have led to different findings in the rumination/worry transfer tasks. 
Firstly, the nature of tasks between the training and the transfer task in the current 
study might have been reversed by repeated exposure to further threat materials. 
Direct comparison with Cohen et al.’s study is not possible here, as they simply 
report that participants completed “additional cognitive tasks” between training and 
rumination. It seems unlikely, though, that those tasks involved anything akin to the 
attentional control transfer task, which required participants to be further exposed to 
combinations of flankers, pictures and colour discrimination, or the recognition task, 
which involved examining pictures. Although booster training was included prior to 
the worry transfer task to try to mitigate this, it may, at only 24 trials, have been too 
short to work. 
Alternatively, if the training task led to mood differences, the different intervening 
tasks in the two studies might have varied in the effects they had on mood. In the 
current study, a filler task was included between the booster training and the worry 
transfer task to try to eliminate the effects of mood. This was a methodological flaw, 
which may have affected result. 
Finally, the nature and length of intervening tasks in the current study may mean 
that cognitive fatigue played a role. Some support for this idea comes from 
performance on the worry transfer task: just under half the participants failed to 
respond on the first trial. While there are no published data to compare this with, the 
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task is currently being piloted in other studies, and it appears that these findings are 
unusual. Fatigue may therefore have led to lapses in concentration on the task, 
rendering the data unreliable. 
4.2. Possible mechanisms of change 
The study attempted to test two competing theories for the mechanism of any change 
resulting from the training: increased attentional control improving the ability to 
inhibit negative material, or depleted attentional resources resulting in reduced 
processing of negative material resulting in reduced impact on mood. Table 8 and 
Table 9 summarise the predictions and key findings in support of each hypothesis. 
Conclusions drawn here must inevitably be very tentative, as overall the evidence 
suggests that the training was unlikely to have been effective. Additionally, more 
predictions were made for the depleted attentional resources theory, which may give 
the impression of greater support for this theory. 
Table 8  





Training group will show an 
improvement over time during 
training on colour discrimination 
speeds following threat pictures 
(compared to control group) 
No Direct comparison between groups 
for first and last blocks shows no 
significant difference 
(Although training group show a 
significant improvement in second 
half of task, and control group do 
not, this is not a rigorous test of 
group differences) 
Attentional control transfer task 
Training group will show less 
emotional interference 
No No significant group difference in 
emotional interference (i.e., no 
evidence that training group is less 
disrupted by negative pictures) 
 113 
 
Table 9  





Training group will show less 
impact of threat pictures on 
colour discrimination speeds 
than control group across all 
trials 
No No significant group differences 
Mood ratings 
Control training group will 
have worse post-training mood 
Partially Greater reduction in positive mood 
for control group 
No significant difference in negative 
mood change 
Worry task 
Post-training mood will predict 
performance 
Partially Positive mood is significant predictor 
of proportion of non-negative 
thoughts (but must be interpreted with 
caution as data may not have fully 
met requirements for linear 
regression) 
Mood not a significant predictor of 
longest run of non-negative thoughts 
Recognition task 
Training group will perform 
less well at recognising threat 
pictures, control group less well 
at recognising neutral pictures 
No No significant group differences 
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Predictions relating to mood changes and their effects are particularly important for 
the theory of reduced processing of threat pictures, as this is presumed to account any 
group differences in negative thinking. Cohen et al. (2015) also noted this possibility, 
and examined mood change using a mood rating scale that the current one is 
modelled on. They do not report the pattern of any mood differences between 
groups, but report that they were not significant. They did, however, as part of a 
further analysis, report an interaction between a measure of habitual brooding and 
training condition on sad mood, suggesting the possibility of some more subtle mood 
differences between the groups. They also divided their scale into three subscales 
(sad, happy and anxious moods), in contrast to the current study, which only divided 
it into positive and negative moods; the greater variance that may arise from scales 
with fewer items could reduce the chance of group difference reaching significance. 
Overall, the evidence in support of either theory is weak. The only evidence to 
support the theory that attentional control is being trained is a single finding of 
improvement in the training task that is based on poor statistical analysis, and 
contradicted by a more rigorous analysis. The partial findings of mood effects offer 
some support for theory of reduced processing of threat pictures. However, the 
recognition task findings do not provide the predicted support: the test appears to 
have been sensitive enough to find an expected effect of more accurate of negative 
pictures in general (Kensinger, 2011), so a failure to find a group difference is 
problematic for this theory. 
4.3. Clinical implications 
The largely negative, and best equivocal, nature of the findings limit the clinical 
significance of this research. If the training procedure could be improved such that it 
led to a reduction in worry, then in principle it could form the basis of a more 
clinically focused training paradigm. However, it would be important first to 
investigate more thoroughly the mechanisms through which the apparent worry 
reduction came about. If the reduced threat processing theory is correct, any transfer 
effects are simply the result of worse mood in the control group and no meaningful 
treatment could be developed based on this. If, on the other hand, it were to emerge 
that the training paradigm does increase the ability to exert attentional control to 
inhibit threatening material, this could have implications for clinical practice. 
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Attentional control deficits are thought to be central to worry and anxiety (Eysenck et 
al., 2007; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012), and improving attentional control may therefore 
bring about changes in some of the underlying cognitive processes contributing to the 
persistence of worry. 
4.4. Limitations 
The study has a number of limitations. Basing the choice of pictures in IAPS valence 
and arousal data, although it followed Cohen et al.’s (2015) procedure, seems likely to 
have been flawed, given that the perception of threat may be very different when 
pictures are viewed for 100 ms as opposed to the 6 s viewing used for the original 
ratings. The choice of items for measuring mood may not have been ideal; a mixture 
of negative mood items were chosen from the PANAS-X (see Appendix 7), but given 
the associations between threat, anxiety and worry, a measure of mood focused more 
specifically on anxiety might have been more sensitive to relevant change. The 
inclusion of a filler task after booster training was a notable methodological flaw, 
given that testing for an effect of hypothesised mood effects was an aim of the study. 
More generally, the complexity of the design, while enabling multiple tests of the 
competing theories in the hope of strengthening the overall findings, may have 
worked against finding clear results in some individual tasks. Although the overall 
session length was not unreasonably long, the large number of tasks involving 
repeated presentations of stimuli requiring fast decision times may have led to 
significant cognitive fatigue. It is possible that some combination of the length of time 
between the training and worry transfer tasks, the shortness of the booster training, 
and the effects of fatigue, may have served to erase any potential group differences. 
Although a power calculation was completed for the worry transfer task, and the 
sample size based on this, no such calculation was completed for the other analyses. 
While this is unlikely to explain any differences from Cohen et al.’s (2015) findings, as 
the sample sizes were very similar (68 in Cohen et al., 69 in the current study), it does 




The study did not provide evidence to suggest that repeated pairings of incongruent 
flanker decisions with threat stimuli can result in reduced worry. Nor did it provide 
significant support for the idea that doing so can improve attentional control, such 
that attention to threatening material can be more easily inhibited. It provided some 
very limited support for the idea that the effects found in a comparable study aimed 
at reducing rumination may have arisen from depleted attentional resources, 
resulting in reduced exposure to distressing stimuli, but this conclusion can be no 
more than very tentative at this point. 
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Appendix 4: Picture stimuli 
Threat pictures 
Categories and examples of threat pictures: 
• Individual threat and violence (e.g., pointed gun, assault) 
• Group threat and violence (e.g., riot, armed soldiers) 
• Accident and injury (e.g., car crash, fire) 
• Medical (e.g., injection, surgery) 
• Animals (snake with open jaws) 
• Facial expressions (e.g., angry, distressed) 
Neutral pictures 
Categories and examples of neutral pictures: 
• Activities (e.g., card game, shopping) 
• Scenes (e.g., street scene, shipyard) 
• Objects (e.g., fruit, basket), 
• Natural environment (e.g., field, sky) 
• Neutral facial expressions 
Picture set comparisons 
Five sets of pictures were used in total, each consisting of half threat and half neutral 
pictures: 24 used only in the attentional control transfer tasks, 24 used only in the 
training task, 24 used both in the attentional control transfer tasks and in the training 
task, 24 distractor items used in the recognition task, and 24 used for a booster 
training task. One-way ANOVAs for the five sets of threat pictures showed no 
significant effect of set on valence, F(4,55) = 0.26, p = .09, or on arousal, F(4,55) = 
0.04, p = .99. One-way ANOVAs for the five sets of neutral pictures showed no 
significant effect of set on valence, F(4,55) = 0.86, p = .50, or on arousal, F(4,55) = 
0.27, p = .90.  
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Patient Name:__________________________________                              Date:_______________ 
 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
 
Instructions:  Rate each of the following statements on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of me”) to 5 (“very 







 Not at all typical                                         Very typical 
       of me                                                       of me                           
1.     If I do not have enough time to do everything, 
        I do not worry about it. 
          1              2              3             4              5 
2.     My worries overwhelm me.           1              2              3              4              5 
3.     I do not tend to worry about things.           1              2              3              4              5 
4.     Many situations make me worry.            1              2              3              4              5 
5.     I know I should not worry about things, but 
        I just cannot help it.  
          1              2              3              4              5 
6.     When I am under pressure I worry a lot.           1              2              3              4              5 
7.     I am always worrying about something.           1              2              3              4              5 
8.     I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts.           1              2              3              4             5  
9.     As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry 
        about everything else I have to do.   
          1              2              3              4             5  
10.   I never worry about anything.           1              2              3              4             5 
11.   When there is nothing more I can do about a 
        concern, I do not worry about it any more. 
          1              2              3              4             5 
12.   I have been a worrier all my life.           1             2               3              4             5 
13.   I notice that I have been worrying about  
        things. 
          1             2               3              4             5 
14.   Once I start worrying, I cannot stop.           1             2               3              4             5 
15.   I worry all the time.            1             2               3              4             5 
16.   I worry about projects until they are all done.            1             2               3              4             5 
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Appendix 6: Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale 




DAS S 21 Name: Date:
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the statement 
applied to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time 
on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0  Did not apply to me at all
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time
1 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3
2 I was aware of dryness of my 
mouth
0      1      2      3
3 I couldn't seem to experience 
any positive feeling at all
0      1      2      3
4
I experienced breathing difficulty 
(eg, excessively rapid breathing,
breathlessness in the absence 
of physical exertion)
0      1      2      3
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3
7 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0      1      2      3
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3
9
I was worried about situations in 
which I might panic and make
a fool of myself
0      1      2      3
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3
14
I was intolerant of anything that 
kept me from getting on with
what I was doing
0      1      2      3
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3
19
I was aware of the action of my 
heart in the absence of physical
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate 
increase, heart missing a beat)
0      1      2      3
20 I felt scared without any good 
reason
0      1      2      3
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3
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Appendix 7: Mood assessment 
All items taken from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form 
([PANAS-X], Watson & Clark, 1999). 
Positive mood items 
• At ease  
• Cheerful  
• Relaxed  
• Happy  
• Calm  
• Enthusiastic  
Negative mood items 
• Frightened  
• Distressed  
• Downhearted  
• Shaky  
• Sad  
• Upset  
• Nervous  
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Appendix 8: Filler task 
Adapted from the Speed of Comprehension Test (Baddeley et al., 1992) 




Removed for copyright reasons 
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Appendix 9: Data exclusions 
Training task 
One control group participant completed only 10% of colour discrimination 
responses accurately, so their data were excluded from the analysis. 10.8% of all 
remaining trials were excluded as follows (note that some trials may be excluded for 
more than one reason): missed flanker response (3.1%), missed colour discrimination 
response (0.8%), inaccurate flanker response (2.1%), inaccurate colour discrimination 
response (4.9%), flanker RTs below 150 ms (0.01%), colour discrimination RTS 
below 150 ms (0.02%), and colour discrimination RTs above 1,500 ms (0.6%). 
Mood 
Data from two control group participants were excluded, one due to a technical error 
in data collection, and one because their scores represented an extreme outlier for 
both positive and negative difference scores (greater than quartile ± 3 x interquartile 
range of the sample as a whole). 
Worry transfer task 
One control group participant was an extreme outlier in terms of missing trials, with 
36.7% of trials missing, but as preliminary analyses indicated that dropping their 
data had no marked effects on the findings, their data were retained. Another neutral 
training participant missed two trials because of equipment failure, but their total 
completed trials were well within the ordinary range for participants as a whole, and 
so their data were also retained. 
Attentional control task 
Trials were not excluded in the basis of colour discrimination scores, as these were 
not used in the subsequent analyses. For the baseline task data, one control group 
participant completed only 27% of flanker discrimination responses accurately, so 
their data were excluded from baseline analyses (not reported here); 3.9% of all 
remaining trials were excluded because of missed flanker responses, and 0.03% for 
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flanker RTs < 150 ms. For the post-training task data, 2.2% of trials were excluded 
because of missed flanker responses and 0.03% for flanker RTs < 150 ms. 
Recognition task 
Forty-seven individual trials with RTs below 150 ms were dropped; this represented 
1.42% of all trials. One threat training condition participant’s mean confidence data 
was an extreme outlier: 10.25 for neutral pictures and 6.46 for threat pictures, 
compared with a range for the remaining participants of 46.92–96.29 and 41.67–
92.91 for neutral and threat pictures respectively. Preliminary analyses suggested that 
removing this participant’s data did not affect overall significance levels, and did lead 
to improvements in the distribution of residuals, which were highly non-normally 
distributed. Furthermore, the confidence ratings are an entirely subjective measure, 
which means individual differences not relevant to the main hypotheses may have 
contributed to these unusual scores. Their data were therefore removed. 
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Appendix 10: Training task analysis: Recruitment of 
attentional control 
To check that attentional control was being recruited by the incongruent flankers 
(and thus that this aspect of the task was working correctly), an analysis was carried 
out of flanker response speeds. This follows Cohen et al.’s analysis of training task 
data. 
A multilevel linear modelling analysis was carried out with flanker responses speed as 
the dependent variable. Training condition (threat training, neutral training), 
congruence (congruent, incongruent), and the interaction between them were 
entered as predictors. It was predicted that the typical congruence effect would be 
found, and that any effect of group or interaction would suggest that the attentional 
control was being recruited differentially between groups (which was not anticipated, 
but would indicate a need to control for this in further analyses).The results yielded 
the predicted main effect of congruence (b = -0.27, SE = 0.02, p < .001), with 
response speeds on congruent trials being faster (M = 2.23, SD = 0.27) than 
incongruent (M = 1.96, SD = 0.27), d = 0.96. There was no significant main effect of 
training condition (b = -0.01, SE = 0.06, p = .88) and no significant interaction 
between training condition and congruence (b = 0.02, SE = 0.03, p = .44), suggesting 
that the flanker task worked as intended, and attentional control was recruited 
similarly in both groups. 
Note: Examination of the standardised residuals suggested the possibility of a non-
linear relationship; however, data transformation did not affect the outcomes of the 
analysis, and so the untransformed data were retained. 
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Appendix 11: Training task analysis – effect of picture 
valence scores 
 The main analysis (reported in the Results section) showed no effect of pictures 
valence on colour discrimination speeds in the training task (although the direction of 
difference, with discrimination decisions following neutral pictures being slightly 
faster (M = 2.09, SD = 0.45) than those following threat pictures (M = 2.06, SD = 
0.45), d = 0.08, was as expected). A further analysis was carried out to explore this 
unexpected result. 
Simple linear regression analyses were carried out, using the IAPS valence scores of 
the picture stimuli as a continuous predictor variable. Valence score significantly 
predicted colour discrimination speeds, F(1, 46) = 6.01, p = .02, R² = .12. However, 
this relationship was no longer found when threat and neutral pictures were 
considered separately: valence of threat pictures was not a significant predictor for 
threat, F(1, 24) = 0.87, p = .36, R² = .04; neither was valence of neutral pictures, F(1, 
24) = 0.09, p = .76, R² = .00. As Figures , 4 and 5 make clear, the small valence 
effect, accounting for 12% of the variability in colour discrimination scores overall, 
appears to arise from the existence of the two categories of picture (threat and 
neutral); within the categories, there is no significant relationship between valence 
and speed. 
This suggests that, while negative pictures tend to have a greater impact on 
subsequent colour discrimination speeds than neutral pictures do, the effect is likely 
to be small, and the relationships is weak at the level of individual picture valences. 
This may have affected the effectiveness of the training, which paired incongruent 
flankers with negative pictures. It may also have meant that difference in colour 





Figure 3. Valence score of all pictures as a predictor of colour discrimination speeds, 
showing a significant effect 
 
Figure 4. Valence score of neutral pictures as a predictor of colour discrimination 





































































Figure 5. Valence score of threat pictures as a predictor of colour discrimination 
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